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CONSTITUTIONAL DISPLACEMENT
TIMOTHY ZICK*

This Article examines the intersection between territory and
constitutional liberty. Territoriality, as defined by Robert Sack, is the
attempt to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and
relationships by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area.
Territoriality affects constitutional liberty in profound ways. These effects
have been apparent in certain infamous historical episodes, including the
territoriality of racial segregation, the geographic exclusion and
internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II, early state
migratory exclusions, and isolation of the sick and mentally ill. Today,
governments are resorting to territorial restrictions in an increasing
number of circumstances, including detention of enemy combatants at
Guantanamo Bay, attempted expulsion of illegal immigrants from local
communities, banishment of convicted sex offenders from vast geographic
areas, exclusion of homeless persons from public spaces, and proposed
isolation and quarantine of victims ofpandemics and bio-terrorist attacks.
These and other measures have produced what the Article refers to as
Geographies of Justice, Membership, Punishment, Purification, and
Contagion. Within these geographies, persons and groups are subject to
constitutional displacement-the territorial restriction or denial of
fundamental liberties. The displacements examined in the Article
substantially restrict or deny basic liberties including access to justice,
migration, movement, communal and political membership, and the ability

* Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. I would like in particular to thank the
members oftbe Law and Geography working group for their comments at the 2008 Annual Meeting of
the Law and Society Association. I would also like to thank the editorial staff of tbe Washington
University Law Review for their timely and diligent editing.
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to be present in places of one's own choosing. The Article demonstrates
that the Constitution provides less than robust protection from certain
forms of territorial displacement. Analyzing the Constitution itself as a
spatial framework, one that relies upon place, geography, and territory for
various purposes, the Article shows that displacement arises from extraterritorial and intra-territorial "spatial gaps" in text and structure. The
Article proposes that these spatial gaps be narrowed or closed.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In ways not always fully appreciated, constitutional liberty and
spatiality are inextricably linked. The geography of cyberspace does not
currently permit much in the way of official spatial regulation. 1 On firmer
ground, however, spatiality remains a powerful regulatory tool.
Geographic and territorial borders determine membership in polities, such
that mere physical presence within a territory gives rise to certain rights
and privileges. Expulsion or removal extinguishes these claims. Spatial
restrictions on ingress or egress affect locomotion, mobility, and
migration. Restrictions on the places or territories in which a person may
reside, work, or recreate affect fundamental interests in choice of
community, pursuit of livelihood, and the basic dignity associated with
freedom of movement. Spatial restrictions also affect liberties we do not
routinely associate with place or geography, including access to judicial
process, equality, and rights of association and expression? In many
respects, there is no more fundamental liberty than the freedom to choose
one's own place. 3 The loss of that freedom can result in severe forms of
not only personal, but constitutional, displacement.
Spatiality is a useful, necessary, and often legitimate organizing and
constituting principle. Governments rely upon borders and boundaries in
carrying out a host of ordinary functions, including defense of sovereignty,
distribution of privileges and benefits, and maintenance of public order. 4
But as we shall see, governmental control over and manipulation of place,
geography, and territory can be very dangerous to individual liberty. 5

1. That does not mean, however, that cyberspace is not subject to substantial private ordering.
Dan Hunter, Cyberspace As Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REv. 439
(2003).
2. See generally Timothy Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, 84 TEX. L. REv. 581 (2006)
(examining relationship between spatial regulations and First Amendment liberties); Timothy Zick,
Space, Place, and Speech: The Expressive Topography, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 439 (2006)
(discussing expressive aspects of place) [hereinafter Zick, Space, Place, and Speech].
3. The social justice effects of geography and territory are examined in DAVID M. SMITH,
GEOGRAPHY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (1994). On territory and its relationship to membership, see
MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY ( 1983 ).
4. See discussion infra Part II.B.
5. Sometimes the danger is not immediately apparent. For example, the Los Angeles Police
Department recently unveiled a plan to geographically map Muslim communities within the city to
purportedly combat radicalization in religious enclaves. The plan raised serious equal protection and
religious free exercise concerns. More disturbingly, in the event of a terrorist threat or other
emergency, such mapping might also have been used to restrict community members' liberty of
movement. See Neil MacFarquhar, Protest Greets Police Plan to Map Muslim Angelenos, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 9, 2007, at A23. After sustained public outcry, officials decided to scrap the plan. Associated
Press, California: Police Shelve Muslim Mapping Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2007, at A24.
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The geographer Robert Sack refers to the strategic use of space as
territoriality, which he defines as "the attempt by an individual or group to
affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by
delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area." 6 Working from
that basic definition, this Article examines the intersection of territoriality
and liberty, and the effect of that intersection on certain persons and
groups-namely, war on terrorism detainees, undocumented and other
immigrants, released sex offenders, the destitute and homeless, and those
who are either afflicted with a contagious disease or believed to be so.
These illustrative examples will show how governments use territory to
map and enforce distinct legal geographies, both within and outside the
territorial boundaries of the United States. They will demonstrate how the
combination of laws, customs, and physical borders creates and shapes
what the Article describes as distinct "Geographies of Displacement,"
which in turn affect the exercise of fundamental personalliberties. 7
By manipulating territory and moving enemy detainees just outside the
geographic boundaries of the United States, the United States has been
able for some time to effectively suspend the rule of law with regard to a
class of detainees who have been designated "enemy combatants."8 The
Supreme Court partially closed this particular territorial gap, at least as a
matter of constitutional interpretation, in the recent decisions in
Boumediene v. Bush and Al Odah v. United States. 9 There the Court held
that aliens detained in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, a territory over which the
United States exercises complete jurisdiction and control but not legal
sovereignty, are entitled to the protections of the writ of habeas corpus. 10
Although some of the majority opinion's statements are open to broad
interpretations, the Court did not directly address the extraterritorial reach
of the Constitution in other territories or contexts.u Guantanamo Bay,
while certainly the most visible territorial manipulation, is not the only
"legal black hole" 12 the government has sought to create by manipulating

6. ROBERT DAVID SACK, HUMAN TERRITORIALITY: ITS THEORY AND HISTORY 19 (1986).
7. See NICHOLAS K. BLOMLEY, LAW, SPACE, AND THE GEOGRAPHIES OF POWER 7-8 (1994)
(arguing that law of place is constitutive of political and social relations).
8. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 570-71 & n.l (2006) (discussing designation and status
of '"enemy combatants"'). See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus

Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror, !20 HARV. L. REv. 2029, 2031 (2007)
(discussing legal and constitutional status of "enemy combatants").

9. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
I 0. !d. at 2262.
II. The questions left open by Boumediene are discussed in Gerald L. Neuman, The
Extraterritorial Constitution after Boumediene v. Bush, 81 S. CAL. L. REv. (forthcoming 2009).
12. Johan Steyn, Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, 53 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 1 (2004).
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territory. "Black sites" and destinations of "extraordinary rendition" have
also been used to situate detainees outside the protection of legal
processes. 13 Primarily as a result of the war on terrorism, a new
Geography ofJustice has taken shape. 14
Immigration policies are by their very nature territorial; among other
things, they determine rightful presence within a particular territory. Here,
too, territorial tactics are increasingly prevalent. Congress has appropriated
funds to supplement existing federal immigration laws with a massive
steel fence along the Mexican border. 15 This grand architecture of
exclusion will physically and territorially separate America from its
southern neighbors. As well, federal immigration officials have been
redefining the very notion of the "border," in some cases moving the legal
border into areas within the United States. 16 Meanwhile, numerous states
and localities have enacted their own territorial exclusions, ostensibly to
combat unlawful immigration. 17 Some have threatened to enforce
trespassing laws against illegal immigrants, thus criminalizing their mere
presence in a territory. 18 Other localities have sought to expel day laborers
from public areas like street comers and parking lots, through antiloitering laws and official harassment. 19 A host of local immigration
measures-supplemented or in some cases supplanted by recent

13. See Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and the Rule
of Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1333, 1336 (2007) (defining "extraordinary rendition"). To prevent
this practice, several countries recently ratified a treaty. International Convention for the Protection of
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, Feb. 6, 2007, http://untreaty.un.org/English/notpubll
IV_16_english.pdf. The United States refused to sign the agreement on the ground that it failed to
meet U.S expectations. Molly Moore, US. Declines to Join Accord on Secret Detentions, WASH.
POST, Feb. 7, 2007, at A14. The practice of transferring detainees to black sites is discussed in Leila
Nadya Sadat, Ghost Prisoners and Black Sites: Extraordinary Rendition Under International Law, 37
CASE W. REs. J. lNT'L L. 309 (2006).
14. See generally Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 2501 (2005)
(discussing the importance of territory in recent Supreme Court terrorism cases) [hereinafter Raustiala,
The Geography of Justice]. Professor Raustiala explores the relationship between geography and legal
rights in greater detail in KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG?
TERRITORIALITY AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW (forthcoming 2009) [hereinafter
RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG?].
15. The Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-367, 120 Stat. 2638 (2006) (codified as
passed in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.), authorizes the construction of the border fence.
16. See Ayelet Shachar, The Shifting Border of Immigration Regulation, 3 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. &
CIV. LIBERTIES 165, 167 (2007) (discussing the flexibility and malleability of the legal territorial
border).
17. See Julia Preston, Immigration is at Center of New Laws Around US., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6,
2007, at A12 (noting surge in state and local immigration laws).
18. See Pam Belluck, Novel Tack on Illegal Immigrants: Trespass Charges, N.Y. TIMES, July 13,
2005, at A14 (describing local arrests).
19. See Fernanda Santos, Village Officials Harassed Day Laborers, Judge Rules, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 21,2006, at B3 (noting that in one community police engaged in discriminatory harassment).
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aggressive federal enforcement raids-have sought to prohibit illegal
immigrants from working or living in certain territories and
communities. 20 These laws impose fines on landlords who rent to
undocumented aliens, and penalize businesses that employ workers
without proper proof of immigration status? 1 Through such measures,
municipalities seek to create undocumented-immigrant-free zones. Owing
to their breadth, however, some of these measures may operate to displace
legal resident aliens as well as those unlawfully present. Across the United
States and at its fortified borders, a new Geography of Membership has
taken shape.
Among the recently displaced, no group of persons is more reviled than
convicted sex offenders. Once released into the community, they face an
intricate system of territorial restrictions designed to exclude them from
entire communities-sometimes great portions of entire states. 22 State and
local laws forbidding convicted sex offenders from living within a
specified distance of schools, churches, bus stops, and other "anchor
points" effectively preclude them from living in many of a state's most
populous areas. 23 The effect of such measures on individual liberty and
human dignity can be profound? 4 Banishment-by-exclusion, or "internal
exile," prevents convicted offenders (regardless, in many cases, of the
specific nature of their offenses) from living with their families, attending
their churches, taking part in public recreation, or maintaining their
livelihoods. 25 Other, less systematic territorial measures have also been
imposed on this group. Sex offenders, along with some persons who have
merely expressed a sexual interest in children, have been consigned to
house boats and mobile housing units, 26 indefinitely precluded from being

20. See Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND.
L. REv. 787, 799-807 (2008) (describing state and local immigration measures).
21. The ordinance adopted by Hazleton, Pennsylvania, is typical of such measures. See, e.g.,
Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18 (July 13, 2006), available at http://www.hazletoncity.org/
090806/2006-18%20_ Illegal%20Alien%20Immigration%20Relief0/o20Act. pdf [hereinafter Hazleton
Ordinance 2006-18]; Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-13 (Aug. 15, 2006), 2006-13, available at
http://www.hazletoncity.org/090806/2006-13%20_ Landlord%20Tenant%200rdinance. pdf [hereinafter
Hazleton Ordinance 2006-13].
22. Corey Rayburn Yung, Banishment by a Thousand Laws: Residency Restrictions on Sex
Offenders, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 101 (2007).
23. Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Collectivism and Ex-Offender Residence Exclusion Laws,
92 IOWAL. REv. I, 7, 5-13 (2006) (describing recent state and local sex offender exclusion measures).
24. In Miami, for example, the local residency exclusion law forced released sex offenders to
live under a bridge. Sex Offenders Living Under Miami Bridge, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2007, at A22.
25. Yung, supra note 22, at 122-26 (describing state and local exclusion laws).
26. Corey Kilgannon, Suffolk County to Keep Sex Offenders on the Move, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17,
2007, at B3.
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present in community parks and other public places, 27 and ordered not to
come within a specified distance of any child? 8 A distinct Geography of
Punishment has been developed by state and local officials to exert control
over sex offenders and others deemed a threat to children.
Most Americans live in urban areas. 29 Urban officials have long relied
upon territoriality to maintain public order, safety, and aesthetics. They
have increasingly turned to criminal laws to prohibit certain behaviors,
such as sleeping in public places and panhandling, typically engaged in by
poor and homeless persons. 30 These contemporary descendants of earlier
"broken windows" measures, often billed as efforts to clean up public
places like streets, sidewalks, and parks, make it difficult or impossible for
the homeless and other undesirable populations to remain in certain
geographic areas. 31 Laws banning or spatially restricting sleeping and
panhandling are only the most common example. Increasingly restrictive
territorial measures have been enacted to displace marginal populations
from certain urban areas. 32 For example, a recently adopted Los Angeles
ordinance criminalized the mere presence of the homeless in designated
public places during certain times of day. 33 Other localities have adopted
measures that prohibit feeding homeless persons in parks and other public
places. 34 This evolving Geography of Purification substantially displaces
those who live or spend a substantial amount of time in public places.
Finally, in an age of new and virulent communicable diseases and
threats from bioterrorism, measures aimed at protecting public health and
safety may also displace persons territorially. Quarantine and isolation,
two of the principal measures often relied upon to deal with exposed
populations, are expressly territorial in nature. 35 Although the authority to

27. See Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2004) (upholding local order barring
released sex offender from all public park properties).
28. Man Who Put Girls' Photos on Internet Plans to Move, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2007, at A13.
29. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., FED. HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION, CENSUS 2000 POPULATION
STATISTICS, available at http://www.fuwa.dot.gov/planning/census/cps2k.htm (last visited Dec. 26,
2008) (indicating that 79% of Americans live in urban areas).
30. See Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers,
Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165 ( 1996) (discussing homelessness laws).
31. GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING
ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES (1996).
32. See Katherine Beckett & Steve Herbert, Dealing With Disorder: Social Control in the PostIndustrial City, 12 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 5, 10--16 (2008) (discussing recent innovations in
urban social control, including use of trespass laws, parks exclusion laws, and "off-limits orders").
33. See Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2006) (invalidating ordinance).
34. See Randal C. Archibold, Please Don't Feed Homeless in Parks, Las Vegas Says in
Ordinance, N.Y. TIMES, July 28,2006, at Al8.
35. On the history and practice of quarantine in the United States, see Felice Batlan, Law in the
Time of Cholera: Disease, State Power, and Quarantines Past and Future, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 53, 62-
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impose health-related territorial restrictions is well established,
governments have been shoring up their authority to address new
contagions territorially. 36 Liberties of movement, property, and judicial
process will be substantially affected, in some cases as a matter of public
necessity, by this developing Geography of Contagion.
Territorial regulations like these raise substantial constitutional
concerns. Constitutional scholars have generally engaged territoriality
episodically and non-systematically. For example, some scholars have
analyzed the constitutional right to travel among state territories. 37 The
importance of geography and territory to constitutional jurisdiction has
also received some scholarly attention, particularly in response to geomilitary strategies associated with the war against terrorism. 38 Immigration
scholars have of course long been aware of the special power of
territoriality to affect individual rights. 39 Finally, some scholars have
critically examined extraterritorial exercises of state governmental
authority. 40 While each of these lines of inquiry has exposed certain
features of American territoriality, the intersection of territory and
constitutional liberty deserves to be more systematically examined. This
Article frames constitutional liberty as a distinctly spatial and territorial
concern. It highlights the manner in which laws shape geographies and
territories, in the process affecting some of our most fundamental
individual liberties.

67 (2007).
36. See Control of Communicable Diseases, 70 Fed. Reg. 71,892 (proposed Nov. 30, 2005) (to
be codified at 42 C.P.R. pts. 70, 71); HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC
INFLUENZA: IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/
nspi_implementation.pdf; Bush Authorizes Use of Quarantine Powers in Cases of Bird Flu, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 2, 2005, at A1 0 (noting that executive order lists several communicable diseases subject
to quarantine). The exercise of federal quarantine powers has received some recent media attention.
See, e.g., Lawrence K. Altman & John Schwartz, Near Misses Allowed Man With Tuberculosis to Fly
to and From Europe, Health Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2007, at A13.
37. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999) (discussing right to travel interstate). See, e.g.,
Jide Nzelibe, Free Movement: A Federalist Reinterpretation, 49 AM. U. L. REv. 433 (1999)
(discussing travel jurisprudence).
38. Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, supra note 14. The literature on constitutional scope is
substantial. See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories,
and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power Over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REv. 1 (2002);
J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against A Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 463
(2007).
39. See generally GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS,
BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996) (examining significance of territory and geographic
borders to constitutional citizenship); see also Shachar, supra note 16, at 165 (noting recent
developments in border regulation and control).
40. See, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, The Law of Choice and Choice of Law: Abortion, The Right to
Travel, and Extraterritorial Regulation in American Federalism, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 451 (1992).
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Part II briefly introduces and, for purposes of this Article, distinguishes
the spatial concepts of place, geography, and territory. It then describes the
principal constitutive and governance functions of territoriality. Part III
describes and analyzes the intersection of territory and liberty in a variety
of past and present legal Geographies of Displacement. It begins with
selected antecedent displacements-the territoriality of Jim Crow racial
segregation, World War II exclusion and internment policies, early state
and federal immigration restrictions, and the displacement of the sick, the
contagious, and other vulnerable groups. Part III then examines the five
contemporary Geographies of Displacement referenced above-Justice,
Membership, Punishment, Purification, and Contagion-and summarizes
the constitutional implications of these geographies. This examination
shows that constitutional displacement-the territorial restriction or denial
of constitutional liberties--often occurs within rather prominent external
and internal spatial gaps in our constitutional structure. Part IV examines
the substantial and sometimes devastating effects of contemporary
territorial and constitutional displacements, offers some general
observations regarding the process by which antecedent spatial gaps have
been narrowed or closed, and concludes with some specific suggestions
for narrowing or closing the particular spatial gaps identified in this
Article.
II. TERRITORIALITY, CONSTITUTION, AND GOVERNANCE

The spatial regulation of persons and behaviors often affects some
combination of place, geography, and territory. In order to assess how and
to what degree spatiality affects constitutional liberty, it will be helpful to
frrst identify and distinguish among these spatial concepts. As
geographers, sociologists, and other social scientists know, there are
myriad possible conceptions and defmitions for these terms. 41 For the sake
of clarity and simplicity, this Article generally treats place as local and
everyday lived space, geography as primarily an organizational or
structural concept, and territory as the product of strategic governmental
regulation. 42

41. See, e.g., TIM CRESSWELL, PLACE: A SHORT INTRODUCTION 51 (2004) (describing various
approaches to the concept of"place").
42. The concept of primary interest in this Article is territory. For a detailed examination of the
concept of place as it relates to First Amendment liberties, see TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF
DOORS: PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT LIBERTIES IN PuBLIC PLACES (2008).
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Each of these spatial dimensions is critical in constitutional terms.
Although it is not generally conceptualized by scholars or courts as such,
the Constitution itself rests upon a distinct spatial framework. 43 Spatiality,
in particular its territorial aspects, affects the Constitution's scope or reach,
provides for the national defense, establishes fundamental terms and
conditions of governance, and affects the recognition and scope of
individual liberties. The Constitution structures, punishes, immunizes, and
legitimizes in express or implied spatial terms. Our understanding of the
Constitution's ideal of personal liberty, and for more immediate purposes
our understanding of how various Geographies of Displacement have
arisen, developed, thrived, and in some cases dissipated, will be
significantly enhanced by a clearer understanding of how the Constitution
itself frames matters of territory and spatiality.

A. Place, Geography, and Territory
We live our everyday lives in a variety of different local placeshomes, workplaces, public accommodations, private social institutions,
schools, and communities. A variety of rules, laws, customs, and even
constitutional principles affect relationships and personal liberties within
many of these places. For example, airports, public buildings, shopping
malls, and many other local places are subject to special First Amendment
regimes. 44 Strong privacy rights exist in places like homes and (to a lesser
extent) schools. 45 Equality guarantees, like those in anti-discrimination
statutes, apply in public and even some private social places. 46 As
discussed below, however, the Constitution is rather opaque with regard to
specific liberties of place (with the exception of the home). For rather
obvious reasons, geography and territory were far more fundamental
concerns at the time of the framing.

43. One very notable exception is Akhil Amar, who emphasizes the framers' "geostrategic
vision" regarding the new union of states. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A
BIOGRAPHY 48 (2005). Amar observes that part of the Framers' brilliance lay in their recognition of
the need for geographic unity for purposes of, among other things, national defense and trade. !d. at
46-48 (discussing Framers' various geostrategic considerations).
44. See Zick, Space, Place, and Speech, supra note 2, at 479-81 (discussing expressive liberties
in "non-places" like airports and shopping malls).
45. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003) (recognizing right to engage in
consensual sodomy in the home); Bd. ofEduc. oflndep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830
(2002) (recognizing limited privacy interests for students in public school setting). See also Laura A.
Rosenbury, Between Home and School, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 833 (2007) (assessing associational and
other rights in the various places between home and school).
46. See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-22 (1984) (holding that there is no
associational right to exclude women from membership in organization).
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Our everyday places are situated within geographies-nations, regions,
states, cities, counties, towns, and neighborhoods. Fundamentally, these
geographies clarify where we-and our places-are physically located. As
a constitutional construct, geography identifies and bounds governance
regimes and legal jurisdictions. These boundaries, of course, have
profound constitutional significance. At the state and national levels, for
example, geography defmes and limits sovereignty. 47 The geographic
borders of the United States are critical legal and constitutional markersin terms of diplomacy, trade, national defense, and claims to individual
privileges and liberties. As discussed below, local geographies-states,
cities, and counties-indicate separate, internal sovereign boundaries.
These spatial jurisdictions have some, but not ultimate, governance
authority within their geographic borders. Their authority outside
territorial boundaries is limited; and it is subject to override by a distant
(geographically speaking) central authority. 48
A territory, by comparison, is neither an ordinary local place nor a
mere geographic location. According to Robert Sack:
[I]t is important to distinguish between a territory as a place and
other types of places. Unlike many ordinary places, territories
require constant effort to establish and maintain. They are the
results of strategies to affect, influence, and control people,
phenomena, and relationships. Circumscribing things in space, or
on a map, as when a geographer delimits an area to illustrate where
com is grown, or where industry is concentrated, identifies places,
areas, or regions in the ordinary sense, but does not by itself create a
territory. This delimitation becomes a territory only when its
boundaries are used to affect behavior by controlling access. 49
Thus, Sack identifies territories according to the following general
characteristics: (1) a classification by area, (2) a form of communication
by boundary, and (3) a form of enforcement or contro1. 50 Territory is a
species or type of place or geography (as I have previously defined these
terms); ultimately, however, it is different from both these things. It is
different, as Sack suggests, owing to the exertion of control-not only

47. See generally Timothy Zick, Are the States Sovereign?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 229 (2005)
(discussing territorial and other aspects of state sovereignty).
48. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause).
49. SACK, supra note 6, at 19 (emphasis added).
50. Id. at 21-22. Although Sack mentions control of access as a territorial characteristic, control
over both ingress and egress are apparently contemplated.
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over place and geography but, critically, over people, relationships,
behavior, and phenomena. 51 In sum, places, geographic regions, and other
physical areas become territories when boundaries "are used by some
authority to mold, influence, or control activities."52
This Article examines a variety of legal geographies that meet Sack's
general defmition of territory. As we shall see in Part III, the legal
geographies of Justice, Membership, Punishment, Purification, and
Contagion all represent efforts to create, through communicated and
legally enforced borders, conditions of control over certain persons
(detainees, immigrants, sex offenders, the poor and homeless, and the
sick), relationships, and behaviors. 53
B. Territoriality's Primary Constitutive Functions

Territory serves several basic functions insofar as governments are
concerned. As discussed in this part, it legitimizes and enforces claims to
sovereignty, defines the Constitution's scope or jurisdiction, determines
eligibility for membership in political communities, serves as a basis for
distributing benefits and privileges, and provides a means for removing or
isolating dangerous and threatening persons and behaviors. In the abstract,
these basic territorial functions are not subject to any overarching
normative objection. Territory is undeniably necessary to effective
governance and collective goods such as national defense. Defining
sovereign boundaries, enforcing the rule of law, and protecting public
health, order, and safety are all legitimate governance functions. As we
shall see, however, in certain applications territoriality can and does
substantially restrict and even extinguish constitutional liberties.
1. Territory, Sovereignty, and Governance

Territory and sovereignty are intimately related. This is true even in the
postmodern world, where boundaries and borders can seem less and less
significant. 54 Sovereigns use territory to control access to the critical prize

51. !d. at 19.
52. !d.
53. Although this Article uses Sack's basic definition ofterritoriality, the focus will be somewhat
narrower. For example, Sack's conception of territoriality does not distinguish among the various
persons or institutions that exercise control territorially. This Article focuses solely upon strategic and
other productions of territory by governments and officials. Moreover, although Sack's definition of
territoriality is broad enough to encompass non-human subjects, the Article is concerned only with
territorial displacement of persons.
54. There is a rich literature in geography and political science examining territory and its
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of membership or citizenship. 55 As discussed below, lawful presence
inside a territory determines membership in a political community and
legitimizes certain claims to rights and privileges that accompany this
status. 56 Residence and citizenship may be prerequisites to the right to
vote, to run for and hold political office, and to obtain certain jobs.
Governments also enforce territorial boundaries as a means of internal and
external defense. Within its territory, for example, a sovereign is
empowered to prosecute violations of its laws. 57 To enforce the spatiality
of citizenship and membership, sovereigns must possess the authority to
control territorial borders-to repel and expel.
The United States Constitution is a spatial framework in this and many
other critical governance respects. The Framers focused intently on
territorial boundaries in forming a special kind of geopolitical Union. 58
They were defming-physically and otherwise-a new nation. The
nation's sovereignty was defmed, first and foremost, by reference to the
new government's control over territory. This intersection of sovereignty
and territory was critical in post-founding eras as well. Thus, as Sarah
Cleveland has noted, "[t]erritoriality was integral to nineteenth century
concepts of sovereignty because, under international law principles, a
sovereign's jurisdiction to legally regulate conduct was coterminous with
its territory." 59 Despite the effects of globalization, and in particular the
rise of new governance structures throughout the world, today territory
and sovereignty remain intricately linked. 60 As we shall see, this
traditional relationship has created new opportunities for territorial
manipulation by governments-and new challenges to constitutional
liberty.
With respect to matters of internal governance, the Constitution frames
and organizes in explicit spatial terms. The Framers used place,

relation to sovereignty. See, e.g., JOHN A. AGNEW, PLACE AND POLITICS: THE GEOGRAPHICAL
MEDIATION OF STATE AND SOCIETY (1987); EDWARD W. SOJA, POSTMODERN GEOGRAPHIES: THE
REASSERTION OF SPACE IN CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY (1989).
55. For a discussion of the significance of territorial presence as it relates to inunigration law and
policy, see generally Linda Bosniak, Being Here: Ethical Territoriality and the Rights of Immigrants,
8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 389 (2007).
56. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1 (defining citizenship by reference to place of birth or
naturalization).
57. See Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207 (2008) (holding that Iraq has authority to prosecute
alleged crimes by United States citizens who voluntarily traveled to Iraq and allegedly conunitted
crimes on Iraqi soil).
58. See AMAR, supra note 43, at 45-51 (discussing Framers' strategic thinking with regard to
geography and territory).
59. See Cleveland, supra note 3 8, at 23.
60. SeeRAUSTIALA,supranote 14.
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geography, and territory to establish the location, permanence, and
stability of governance institutions. The central government itself was
situated in a specially constituted territory-the District of Columbia. As
the seat of federal power, the District was (and in many respects remains)
subject to congressional control. 61 It is a unique territory-within-aterritory. The Framers also established the separate chambers of Congress
as distinct places of governance. They gave each House the power to make
its own rules of procedure and internal organization. 62 The Houses are in
many respects spatial enclaves-places of immunity from various legal
prosecutions and liabilities. 63 The Framers also granted legislators
immunity from being "questioned in any other Place" with regard to
statements made in Congress. 64 Finally, the Framers established the
territorial permanence of the legislature by providing that neither House
may adjourn to "any other Place than that in which the two Houses shall
be sitting."65 The Framers were thus acutely aware of the utility and power
of place, geography, and territory when it came to constituting a
permanent locus of central governmental power.
Of course, the biggest spatial challenge facing the Framers was not to
establish governance institutions, but to bind the former colonies together
into a new Union. The Framers used natural geography and territory as
special binding agents. In The Federalist No. 2, Publius described America
as "one connected ... country" with a "succession of navigable waters
form[ing] a kind of chain round its borders, as if to bind it together."66
With regard to commerce, broadly defined, the Framers envisioned "a
demilitarized interstate free-trade zone."67 But they also sought to preserve
the states' own territorial boundaries. Thus, the Constitution's spatial
blueprint expressly provides that "no new State shall be formed or erected
within the Jurisdiction of any other State"; nor may any state be joined
with another absent the consent of both states and Congress. 68 Chief
Justice Marshall famously summarized the union's political geography:
"No political dreamer was ever wild enough to think of breaking down the

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 17.
Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
See id. art. I,§ 6 (Speech and Debate Clause).
!d. (emphasis added).
!d. art. I, § 5, cl. 4 (emphasis added).
THE FEDERALIST No.2, at 38 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossier ed., 1961).

AMAR, supra note 43, at 47.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
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lines which separate the states, and of compounding the American people
into one common mass. " 69
The constitutional principle of dual sovereignty is, of course, based in
large part upon preservation of state territorial boundaries. In both physical
and conceptual terms, the Constitution grants a space of residual
sovereignty to the states. 70 Within their own spaces, the states retain
fundamental internal sovereign prerogatives. 71 They choose their own
(republican) forms of government, hold elections, and determine the
qualifications of those who may vote and be elected. 72 With regard to
internal governance, the Framers provided that Congress may alter the
time, place, and manner of state elections; but it was not permitted to alter
"the places of choosing Senators."73 In sum, the states were to be locally
sovereign territories, subject of course to override by all federal laws made
in pursuance of the Constitution-"the supreme Law of the Land."74 By
thus mixing separate central and state territories, the Framers used
spatiality in ingenious ways-to check and balance the powers granted in
the Constitution, and to plant the seeds of territorial connection (national,
state, regional, and local) that exist to this day. 75
Of course, this structure and organization would all be for naught if the
new government was imperiled by threats from within or outside the new
territory of the United States. In matters of internal defense, the Framers
once again turned to geography and territory to "insure domestic
Tranquility."76 In general, the Framers had what Akhil Amar refers to as a
"geostrategic vision" with regard to both internal and external defense, one
that Professor Amar says "informed much of the antebellum Constitution's
overall structure and many of its specific words."77 The Constitution's
intricate web of spatial relations-including its prohibition on standing
armies, the preservation of state militias, and the requirement that states be
protected against territorial invasion78-was "designed to bind Americans

69. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 159, 198 (1819).
70. U.S. CONST. amend. X (reserving powers not delegated to the United States nor prohibited to
the states to the states or the people).
71. See Zick, supra note 47, at 288-93 (discussing attributes of internal state sovereignty).
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
73. !d. (emphasis added). The Constitution does not refer to more local polities or communities
such as counties, towns, boroughs, villages, or cities. These territories are governed by states as a
function of their residual sovereignty.
74. !d. art. VI, cl. 2. (emphasis added).
75. See SACK, supra note 6, at 153 (observing that framers conceived of territory "as a means of
defining and molding social relations").
76. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
77. AMAR, supra note 43, at 51.
78. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 10, cl. 3; id. amend. II; id. art. IV,§ 3.
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of different regions together and thus prevent the parts from ever warring
against one another or against the whole." 79 Of course, as the Civil War
attests, the geographic and other bonds of Union could become
dangerously strained. Still, one must marvel at the extent to which the
Framers' ingenious geo-strategic framework has generally preserved
internal and external security in and for the United States.
The Constitution's essential blueprint demonstrates that the Framers
were acutely aware of the legitimating, binding, stabilizing, and protective
functions of geography and territory. But the foregoing discussion merely
sketches the original spatial skin of the constitutional corpus. After
massive territorial expansions and the growth of government itself, the
"Land" now governed by the Constitution is characterized by thick
membranes of overlapping and intersecting territories. 80 As we shall see,
constitutional liberties are profoundly affected by these various
intersections and by the spatial gaps left open at the original and later
framings.

2. Territory and Constitutional Domain
As the discussion of sovereignty suggests, one of the primary functions
of territory is to define the scope or domain of a sovereign's authority. For
all their brilliance and prescience, however, the Framers failed to answer
some very basic but critical questions regarding the Constitution's domain:
where and to whom does the Constitution apply? As Gerald Neuman has
observed: "Defining the domain of constitutionalism has major practical
implications for immigration policy, the conduct of foreign affairs,
military action, and the participation of American citizens in an
increasingly global society."81 Issues of constitutional scope or jurisdiction
will be discussed in more detail in Parts III and IV. As we shall see, the
Constitution's conflicting statements regarding scope or jurisdiction have
generated confusion regarding the relationship between territorial presence
and constitutional liberties, as well as various strategic opportunities for
territorial and constitutional displacement. 82
The Framers of the Constitution did not speak very clearly at all with
regard to the relationship between territory and constitutional scope. As

79. AMAR, supra note 43, at 51.
80. U.S. CONST., art. VI (Supremacy Clause).
81. NEUMAN, supra note 39, at 3.
82. For a comprehensive treatment of issues of constitutional scope or domain, see RAUSTIALA,
DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG?, supra note 14.

2009]

CONSTITUTIONAL DISPLACEMENT

531

Gerald Neuman has observed, "[t]he domain of U.S. constitutionalism has
always been contested, and it has grown as the nation has grown. " 83
Certain individual rights, such as those protected by Article IV's
Privileges and Immunities Clause, are plainly available only to persons
who are citizens of and reside within state territories. 84 The Constitution
contains a few other hints of localism as well. The Supremacy Clause
states that the Constitution and all laws made "in Pursuance thereof' shall
be the "supreme Law of the Land,"85 suggesting to some interpreters that
constitutional liberties are limited to the physical area within United States
borders. 86 Other hints of localism are evident in the Preamble, which
reads: "We the People of the United States, in Order to ... secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and
establish this Constitution for the United States of America."87 This
language suggests to some that only native-born persons physically
present on U.S. soil have legitimate claims to constitutionalliberties. 88
As scholars have noted, however, the constitutional text also appears to
be universal in scope or domain. 89 For example, the Constitution's express
limits on governmental powers do not contain any explicit territorial
parameters. 90 Moreover, the liberties enumerated in the Bill of Rights and
elsewhere are afforded generally to "persons" or "the people."91 As Sarah
Cleveland has observed, "most of the Constitution's provisions are not
textually restricted by either the population or the geographic area to
which they apply. Instead, they define the general powers of the national
government or impose general limits on the exercise of these powers."92
Thus, for example, Article I unqualifiedly prohibits the suspension of
habeas corpus and the adoption of ex post facto laws or bills of attainder. 93
We shall return to the rather complicated and contested subject of
constitutional domain later. At least as a textual matter, to the extent the

83. NEUMAN, supra note 39, at 3.
84. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2; see also id. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or [shall any state] deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection ofthe laws.").
85. !d. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
86. See Kent, supra note 38, at 466 (arguing against constitutional universalism, but conceding
that the framing materials do not speak clearly with respect to territorial scope).
87. U.S. CONST. pmbl (emphasis added).
88. Kent, supra note 38, at 510.
89. E.g., Cleveland, supra note 38, at 19.
90. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (setting forth limits on central power).
91. !d. amend. V, XIV, X. From a very early time, aliens have been considered "persons" for
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (applying
Equal Protection Clause to claims of aliens).
92. Cleveland, supra note 38, at 19.
93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
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Framers addressed matters of scope or jurisdiction, their language was
arguably more universal than expressly local. 94 Still, currents of
constitutional localism remain quite strong, and in some sense are also
inscribed in text. As we shall see, broader structural principles and
constitutional values have increasingly been relied upon to resolve textual
uncertainties with regard to domain and to settle jurisdictional conflicts.

3. Territoriality and Political Community
At every level of government, territorial borders are enforced in order
to control access to certain benefits and privileges. Lawful presence within
a territory signifies an intention to be bound by the law of the land;
residence advances one toward fuller acceptance of the social compact
(citizenship). Movement into territory may be discouraged, or expulsion
sought, in order to conserve certain benefits for those deemed legitimately
present, to uphold the rule of law, and to generally ensure that persons are
rightfully entitled to be in a particular territory.
In contrast to the general subject of constitutional scope, the Framers
spoke with considerable clarity regarding the territorial requisites for
obtaining full membership in the nation's political communities. With
regard to the privileges of election and governance, for example, the
Framers relied heavily upon geographic and territorial rules. Eligibility for
election to both Houses of Congress is based, in part, upon citizenship and
residency. 95 One's place of birth determines eligibility for the office of the
Presidency; only "natural born" United States citizens (and those who
have "been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States") may seek
the office. 96 Birth within the United States entitles one to the privileges
and immunities of United States citizenship. 97 Place of residence
determines state citizenship, with its corresponding rights and privileges. 98

94. A somewhat superficial textual examination does not, of course, address the considerable
gloss of history or the policies in favor of or against a universalist interpretation of the Constitution. It
is worth noting that even those who read the text as exhibiting a narrow scope concede that the
framing materials shed very little light on the matter of constitutional domain. See Kent, supra note 38,
at 466 (finding little explicit evidence for universalist or localist approaches in the ratification debates).
The point of this discussion is simply to flag instances in which the Framers appear to have at least
considered the Constitution's general scope or domain.
95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; id. art. I § 3, cl. 3.
96. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. Some have been quite critical of this particular spatial limitation. See,
e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES
WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 152-54 (2006) (critiquing the geographic and
territorial aspects of eligibility for presidential office).
97. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
98. !d.
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In sum, under the original geography of membership persons not properly
anchored to United States geography and territory were not entitled to full
membership privileges.
Why did the Framers adopt such a specific focus on geographic and
territorial nexus with respect to political membership? For one thing, the
ratification of the Constitution was intended to ensure that Americans
would no longer be governed by masters from distant lands. 99 The Framers
may also have believed that connection to territory generally served as an
accurate proxy for loyalty, local knowledge of customs and conditions,
and democratic representation. Territorial presence and residence were
thought to signify intent to enter the nation's social compact, as well as
acceptance of uniquely American ideals and values. 10° Fear that radical
ideologies would be imported from other territories also influenced the
Constitution's distinct geography of governance. 101 Finally, in more
pragmatic terms, territorial residency rules prevented interstate
manipulation of state elections. 102 For these and other reasons, the Framers
required that governors and governed share a connection to state territories
as well as to the new territory of the United States.
Some scholars have argued that placing such substantial weight on
territorial attachments has resulted in serious political and societal harms.
Sanford Levinson, for example, decries what he calls the "bias toward
localism" inherent in the Constitution's territorial rules. 103 Levinson and
other scholars trace the rampant regionalism of the Civil War era, as well
as the contemporary political geography ("red state"/"blue state"), to the
Framers' glorification of territorial localism. 104 One might add to such
costs the seemingly pervasive fear and distrust of those deemed to be
territorial "outsiders." As we shall see, some of the Geographies of
Displacement discussed in Part III are rooted in these founding principles
of territorial localism.

99. AMAR, supra note 43, at 69-70 (noting sentiment that "aliens owing allegiance to foreign
nations and foreign lords could not properly lead America").
100. See NEUMAN, supra note 39, at 9-13 (discussing the importance of social contract theory to
principles of membership and alienage).
101. !d.
102. See AMAR, supra note 43, at 70 (observing that state residency requirement prevented
"wealthy candidates from gaming the system").
103. LEVINSON, supra note 96, at 147-48.
104. See MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL (2006)
(tracing regionalism of politics in 1850s and 1860s to constitutional localism).
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4. Territoriality, Presence, and Privileges
As the foregoing discussion of political membership demonstrates, one
of the fundamental functions or utilities of territory is to preserve certain
privileges and benefits for those lawfully present in a territory. Access to
these privileges is often determined by restrictions on presence within a
territory. This entails regulation of both ingress to and egress from a
sovereign's territory.
Although they were not silent on the matter, the Framers spoke with
less than ideal clarity regarding authority over ingress at the nation's
territorial borders. Congress was granted power to regulate foreign
commerce and to determine a "uniform Rule of Naturalization." 105
Moreover, the central government's responsibility for national defense
necessarily granted some implied authority over territorial borders. Still,
the colonies and early states aggressively policed their own borders,
excluding and expelling various persons and groups whose presence they
considered harmful, threatening, or repugnant to the community .106 By the
late nineteenth century, however, the federal government had essentially
occupied the field of national immigration as an aspect of its own
sovereignty. 107 Since that time, federal restrictions on territorial ingress
have been imposed in furtherance of policies of national security, foreign
relations, and domestic well-being. 108 With regard to those already present,
expulsion or deportation is, of course, a territorial response to violation of
a sovereign's laws or norms. Among other things, expulsion results in a
denial of all privileges associated with presence and membership. Within
very broad limits, federal authorities are now able to condition access to a
multitude of benefits by controlling territorial ingress and physical
presence.

105. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, cl. 4.
106. See Batlan, supra note 35, at 62-67 (discussing colonial and early state quarantine laws); see
also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 29 (1824) (singling out state quarantine laws as valid
state regulations of commerce).
107. See Cleveland, supra note 38, at 100--12 (discussing path to federal control of immigration).
108. Some restrictions on territorial ingress raise serious and, in some cases, unresolved
constitutional questions. For example, the federal government has denied, and continues to deny, entry
to the United States to certain speakers on national security and other grounds. See Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (holding that government need only provide "a facially legitimate
and bona fide reason" for refusal to grant alien speaker a waiver of excludability). Exclusions of alien
speakers that are based on ideological grounds raise substantial First Amendment concerns. Steven R.
Shapiro, Ideological Exclusions: Closing the Border to Political Dissidents, 100 HARV. L. REv. 930
(1987). The nation's borders have sometimes been treated as constitutional non-places, where certain
liberties apply differently or not at all. See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 150 (1925)
(excluding border searches from Fourth Amendment restrictions).
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As critical as they are to political membership and its attendant
privileges, territory and geography are not always determinative of access
to local privileges and largesse. In certain critical respects the
Constitution, explicitly or through longstanding judicial interpretation,
actually submerges geography and territory. For example, by
unambiguous design and longstanding judicial interpretation, the
Constitution prohibits governments from making certain territorial
distinctions in order to preserve unity, ensure comity, and even protect
fundamental liberties like the right to vote. 109 More generally, the
Constitution substantially limits (although it does not entirely prohibit)
state and local efforts to link governmental benefits to territory. Thus, for
example, when they seek to reward or encourage territorial presence or
residence by providing additional welfare payments or other subsidies,
governments must respect a limited but fundamental "right to travel"
across state borders. 110 Article IV' s Privileges and Immunities Clause and
the so-called Dormant Commerce Clause similarly circumscribe state and
local authority to discriminate against territorial outsiders in favor of local
residents. 111
Within these general limits, however, states and localities can and do
preserve certain benefits for those lawfully within their territorial borders.
Local tax laws, business subsidies, and public works projects often serve
this purpose. 112 In addition, many states and localities expressly condition
receipt of certain local benefits, opportunities, and privileges upon
territorial residence. For example, some local governments require that
public officials or employees live within a particular district or regional
territory as a condition of their employment. 113 Local zoning laws can also
indirectly but substantially control population influx into certain

109. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. IV,§ 1 (Full Faith and Credit Clause); id. § 2 (Extradition Clause).
Cj Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964) (holding that "one person, one vote" rule generally
forbids legislatures from apportioning the franchise with reference to geography).
110. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969) (holding that durational residency
requirement for welfare benefits violated equal protection and right to interstate travel). See also Saenz
v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 50{}-()2 (1999) (discussing scope and contours of right to travel); Edwards v.
California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (invalidating state law impeding interstate travel of indigent persons).
111. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (striking down state protectionist
measure). See generally Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense
of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986) (discussing limits of antiprotectionism principle).
112. See, e.g., White v. Massachusetts Council of Const. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 214
(1983) (holding that mayoral order requiring that half of work force for city-funded project must
consist of local residents did not violate the commerce clause).
113. See Wright v. City of Jackson, Miss., 506 F.2d 900, 903 (5th Cir. 1975) (upholding
requirement that all municipal employees live within boundaries of city).
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territories. 114 As we shall see, states and localities often impose expulsive
measures on criminals and other marginal populations, effectively
depriving them of basic local benefits. These and similar measures can
significantly affect the freedom to be present and liberty of movement
within local territories.
Finally, governments sometimes seek to limit egress from territories.
At the federal level, for example, the United States government imposes
extraterritorial travel restrictions for reasons of national security or foreign
policy .115 Recreational and other benefits associated with travel abroad
may thus be denied owing to countervailing national interests. In an effort
to extend the geographic reach of local laws and policies, states sometimes
seek to indirectly limit egress from their territories. A state may do so by
purporting to deny its citizens benefits available in other territories. It
might, for example, refuse to recognize a same-sex marriage procured by
one of its citizens in another state, or seek to punish its citizens for
procuring abortions elsewhere. 116 In these and other instances,
governments seek to extend their control over benefits and privileges
extraterritorially.

5. Territoriality and Police Powers
As used in this Article, the concept of territory is not limited to control
of geographic areas that constitute states or nation-states. Territory also
has an important local dimension. Incident to their police powers, local
authorities routinely use territorial displacement to protect communities
from dangerous or threatening persons, behaviors, and events. Here, again,
the Constitution speaks only faintly with regard to the propriety of
territorial restrictions.
As Michel Foucault noted in several works, control over place or
territory can be a very effective means of disciplining and controlling
populations and behaviors. 117 Foucault noted that place, as he conceived

114. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and
the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767, 795 (1969) (discussing equal protection doctrine as applied to
exclusionary or "snob" zoning).
115. See generally Daniel A. Farber, National Security, The Right to Travel, and the Court, 1981
SUP. CT. REv. 263 (discussing restrictions on international travel).
116. See Mark D. Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Political Heterogeneity in American Federalism,
150 U. PA. L. REv. 855, 856-60 (2002) (describing state laws with extraterritorial effects).
117. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION (Richard Howard trans.,
R.D. Laing ed., 1967) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION]; MICHEL FOUCAULT,
THE BIRTH OF THE CLINIC (A.M. Sheridan trans., R.D. Laing ed., 1976); MICHEL FOUCAULT,
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it, is useful in serving the first need of government-namely, to maintain
order. 118 As he observed, spatial measures tend to "perfect the exercise of
power" by restricting a person's locomotion and mobility_l1 9 This
particular use of territory is quite common. To take the most obvious
example, as of 2005 over two million people were incarcerated in the
United States. 120
As this example illustrates, spatial segregation and exclusion may be
wholly legitimate responses to public safety concerns. Imprisonment is a
sanctioned use of territoriality-a form of deserved spatial, legal, and
(partial) constitutional displacement. In other instances, however,
segregation and other means of displacement may serve as a pretext for
discriminatory treatment of vulnerable or unpopular persons. Foucault
examined how officials routinely use spatiality to separate ailing
communities from healthy ones, the sane from the insane, and men of
higher ranks from those of lower ranks. 121 Some of the territorial measures
discussed in this Article use territory in precisely this fashion; these
restrictions can result in substantial losses of individualliberty. 122
Territoriality can be a very subtle form of control. As Foucault
emphasized, most territorial measures are imposed without resort to
visible force or violence. 123 As a result, although they may be quite
dangerous to personal liberty, the power and effects of territorial measures
are in some cases not obvious or wholly apparent. We shall encounter
several subtle but substantial forms of displacement in the discussion of
the Geographies of Displacement (Parts III and IV). As Foucault also
observed, resort to spatiality or territory often produces more than mere
regulation of populations and behaviors. Displacement sometimes has a
communicative function; it may brand those who are displaced. 124 The

DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed.
1995) (1977) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PuNISH].
118. See FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 117, at 174 (noting that through the
power of place, the state could impose "an exact geometry" upon disorder and dissent).
119. Id. at 206.
120. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, PRISONERS IN 2005
(Nov. 2006), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p05.pdf.
121. See FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 117, at 199.
122. See Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the
Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1258 (1990) (describing effects of police tactics on right to move within
territory).
123. See FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 117, at 177 (noting that control was
exercised through "the laws of optics and mechanics, according to a whole play of spaces, lines,
screens, beams, [and] degrees").
124. !d. at 199.
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spatial division, segregation, and restriction of movement occasioned by
certain exercises of police powers may communicate to the public at large
that a person or class of persons is morally flawed, dangerous, or
contagious. In this respect territoriality speaks, through segregation or
expulsion, to things like status and human dignity.
The Constitution does not speak very clearly with regard to liberties of
mobility and choice of place-the liberties most affected by territorial
restrictions imposed pursuant to traditional police powers. Indeed, on only
a few occasions did the Framers expressly use geography or territory to
delineate the bounds of individual liberty. For example, Article III
simultaneously respects state sovereignty and protects personal liberty by
requiring that the trial of all crimes be held only in the state where the
crime was committed. 125 The Sixth Amendment requires the use of
geographic districts for the empanelment of representative juries. 126 These
defensive or negative references to place are additional examples of the
Framers' geo-strategic governance structure.
But what of the affirmative rights to move about the country, to choose
places and geographies, to change one's place, and to remain in place?
What are the limits of state and local police powers with respect to these
and related spatial liberties?
Historically, there was some explicit support for treating some such
liberties as fundamental. Blackstone referred to "the power of locomotion, of changing situation, or removing one's person to whatsoever
place one's own inclination may direct; without imprisonment or restraint,
unless by due course of law." 127 The Articles of Confederation expressly
provided for liberty of movement among the states. 128
But the Constitution does not specifically address this or other aspects
of personal movement or mobility in explicit terms. Zechariah Chafee,
among others, has suggested that the omission of migratory freedom in
particular merely indicates that the Framers believed this liberty to be
located elsewhere in the text. 129 But colonial and early state migratory
exclusions and expulsions, discussed earlier, would seem to suggest some

125. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. Where the crime is not committed in any state, the trial shall
be held "at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed." !d.
126. !d. amend. VI.
127. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *130.
128. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV ("[T]he people of each state shall have free ingress
and regress to and from any other state .... ").
129. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, at 185
(1956).
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ambivalence toward explicit recognition of such migratory freedom. 130 In
1867, however, a majority on the Supreme Court did indeed recognize a
right to migrate among the states. 131 The Court has never settled on a
constitutional home for this liberty. 132 Thus, it remains the case that one
must ultimately infer constitutional recognition of even the most basic
spatial liberty-to "remov[e] one's person to whatsoever place one's own
inclination may direct." 133
In certain respects it seems that the Framers of the Constitution
envisioned a private, parochial, and rather sedentary people. Only one
specific place-the home-was singled out for special constitutional
treatment. The home is a consecrated constitutional location, one expressly
shielded from various official intrusions. The Third Amendment prohibits
the quartering of soldiers during peacetime "in any house" without the
owner's consent; 134 the Fourth Amendment expressly protects the right of
the people "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures"; 135 and the Fifth Amendment
prohibits the taking of any home (or other private property) without just
compensation. 136 The Second Amendment's right to "bear Arms," which
the Supreme Court recently interpreted to include a right of self-defense in
the home, may also indicate regard for the sanctity of both person and
residence. 137

130. In certain respects, the Constitution's overall spatial framework seems to contemplate an
open and unified geography. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power to
regulate commerce among the several states); id. § 10, cl. 2 (prohibiting states from imposing duties on
imports or exports unless "absolutely necessary").
131. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
132. See Christopher S. Maynard, Nine-Headed Caesar: The Supreme Court's Thumbs-Up
Approach to the Right to Travel, 51 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 297, 298 (2000) (noting that right to travel
has been located in no less than ten constitutional provisions).
133. BLACKSTONE, supra note 127, at *124. Nor did the framers address whether liberty of travel
might be offended by restrictions on travel to territories outside the United States. See Farber, supra
note 115, at 285.
134. U.S. CONST. amend. III.
135. !d. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment's prohibition of "unreasonable" seizures, as well as
the Due Process Clause, may also provide some limited protection for liberties of presence and
movement. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 161 (1972) (invalidating antivagrancy law).
136. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
137. !d. amend. II. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (invalidating gun
control statutes in part because they denied persons the ability to defend the home). Other liberties
associated with the home have been located in the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See, e.g., Frisby
v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (upholding ordinance prohibiting targeted picketing of home); Lindsey
v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 82 (1972) (describing home as "sanctuary"). As the Supreme Court recently
stated, the "liberty" referred to in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause is comprised of
both "spatiaf' and "transcendent" dimensions. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003)
(emphasis added).
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Americans, of course, have never been a home-bound people. The
urges to traverse, explore, and conquer open spaces and territories are
central to the American ethos. 138 Moreover, although privacy has become
a contemporary buzzword, Americans have always lived a substantial part
of their lives in public places. Yet the Framers seem to have scarcely
contemplated the exercise of personal liberties in the public sphere. The
First Amendment protects the people's right "peaceably to assemble" and
to "petition the Government for a redress of grievances." 139 But it does not
say where those liberties may lawfully be exercised, or whether there is a
right to some public place for these (or other) purposes. 140 Moreover, even
assuming one recognizes some degree of migratory liberty, there is no
express or implied guarantee that one may remain in any particular place.
Nor does the Constitution address whether those without private homes
enjoy any right to be present-to exist, in other words-in public places or
territories. In sum, the Constitution does not clearly address the
substantive legitimacy of a myriad of local police power measures that
impose different forms of territorial expulsion. As in other contexts, it
contains some rather significant spatial gaps.
To summarize, the principal constitutive functions of territory are to
structure and legitimize sovereignty; define constitutional scope or
domain; determine eligibility for membership in political communities;
facilitate distribution and allocation of certain benefits and privileges; and
segregate and control persons or behaviors considered threatening to
public health, order, or safety. To varying degrees, the United States
Constitution addresses each of these functions geographically or
territorially. Given the most pressing concerns of the moment, the Framers
of the Constitution exhibited the greatest spatial clarity with respect to
matters of internal governance and territorial defense. As a result, they
bequeathed to future generations some rather challenging questions
regarding the relevance or importance of territory to matters such as
constitutional domain and individual liberties.

138. FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICANHISTORY(1921).
139. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
140. The Supreme Court has indicated that at least some public places-streets and parks-must
be held open for assembly and speech activities. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Orgs., 307 U.S. 496
(1939); see also Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (noting
that public streets and sidewalks have "time out of mind" been used for public assembly and debate).
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III. GEOGRAPHIES OF DISPLACEMENT

Given the connection between territory and some of the principal needs
and functions of government, it should come as little surprise that officials
have often used territory to control events, populations, and certain
behaviors. Historical episodes of racial segregation, internment,
immigration exclusion and restriction, and segregation of the sick and
infirm were explicit territorial responses to perceived threats of the day.
Today, governments are responding territorially to a very similar list of
perceived threats-alien enemies and suspected terrorists, illegal
immigrants, sex offenders, the destitute and homeless, and the contagious.
The territorial regulation of these populations and their behaviors is
mapping distinctive legal Geographies of Displacement both within and
outside the borders of the United States.
A. Some Antecedent Territorial Measures
Territory and constitutional liberty have intersected throughout
American history. Systematic racial segregation, wartime exclusion and
internment, exclusion of migrants and immigrants, and displacement of
sick and marginalized persons were critical episodes in our nation's
constitutional history. In these instances governments segregated,
disciplined and controlled persons and behaviors through territory. They
limited access to justice, equality, mobility, and other core constitutional
liberties. Further, through these territorial measures officials
communicated something distinct about the character of those displacedfor example, their lack of dignity or loyalty. The selection and discussion
of specific antecedent displacements in this part is not intended to suggest
a moral or other normative equivalence with the more contemporary
displacements described in the next part. As we shall see, however, there
are some instructive parallels and useful lessons to be learned from this
history.
1. Racial Segregation and "Hyper-Territoriality"
Perhaps the most infamous example of territorial displacement is the
post-emancipation segregation and exclusion imposed upon blacks. At its
very core, segregation was a spatial and territorial institution. Official
policies, coupled with local customs, imposed what the geographer David
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Delaney has described as the "geopolitics of race and racism." 141 Whites
were deeply threatened by the prospect that newly emancipated blacks
would soon be living among them, in "their" territories. Denied the power
of institutional slavery, whites enforced their vision of power and status by
asserting control over local territories.
From the late 1800s to the mid-1960s, Black Codes and Jim Crow laws
created an extraordinary form of territorial segregation. 142 Southern and
border-state territorial measures enforced strict and well-defined territorial
boundaries with respect to all aspects of society. 143 The infamous Black
Codes denied blacks access to both private and public places and
territories. Under the Codes, and later pursuant to pervasive Jim Crow
legislation, racial segregation and exclusion were enforced "in the courts,
schools, and libraries, in parks, theaters, hotels and residential districts, in
hospitals, insane asylums--everywhere, including on sidewalks and in
cemeteries."144 This spatial-racial segregation extended well beyond places
of public accommodation. In some instances, blacks were forbidden to
appear in public at all-other than as menial servants. 145 Vagrancy laws
restricted their right to appear on the public streets. Even prostitutes of
different races were made to work separate streets, districts, and
localities. 146 Private residential segregation was also strictly enforced,
through public laws and private racially restrictive covenants. 147 In urban
and residential areas the imposition of "municipal apartheid" through
zoning codes prevented blacks from living in certain neighborhoods. 148
David Delaney characterizes this history as a "process of fanatical
hyper-territoriality." 149 Vast geographies were reshaped in this fashion, on
explicit racial-territorial terms. As Delaney explains, this process

141. DAVID DELANEY, RACE, PLACE, AND THE LAW 1836-1948, at 3 (1998).
142. See generally C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1955). See also
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE
FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004 ).
143. See DELANEY, supra note 141, at 96--97 (discussing segregation measures during Jim Crow
era).
144. IX C. VANNWOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH 1877-1913, at 212 (Wendell Holmes
Stephenson & E. Merton Coulter eds., 1951). See also J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO
BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954-1978, at 17-18 (1979).
145. See WILKINSON, supra note 144.
146. Id. at 18.
147. See Rachel D. Godsil, Race Nuisance: The Politics of Law in the Jim Crow Era, 105 MICH.
L. REv. 505 (2006) (discussing use of private restrictive covenants).
148. DELANEY, supra note 141, at 105.
149. !d. at 96.

2009]

CONSTITUTIONAL DISPLACEMENT

543

presupposed the creation of more or less durable lines and spaces or
the addition of an increment of meaning to existing lines and
spaces. It entailed the assignment of consequences to the crossing of
lines. It was constituted by ensembles of stationary space, such as
rooms, toilets, buildings, parks, and cemeteries, and by movable
spaces such as streetcars, trains, and later buses and airplanes. In
some situations segregation was effected by duplication of
functional spaces: schools, parks, cemeteries, bars, YMCAs,
libraries, washrooms, phone booths, and elevators; in other
situations, by subdivision or compartmentalization, as in waiting
rooms, jails, theaters, some hospitals, streetcars, and so on. In many
instances segregation meant the simple denial of facilities. 150
The exclusion and displacement effected through racial "hyperterritoriality"151 were devastating to personal liberties. There was, of
course, the denial of basic rights of equality, liberty of movement, and
public presence. More generally, and with even more devastating effects,
race-based territoriality communicated blacks' fundamental inferiority and
lack of human dignity; it signified their legal and societal expulsion. Of
course, as Delaney notes, "[e]xclusion and inferiority were integral to the
entire system of radical segregation." 152
Remarkably, much of this systematic race-based displacement occurred
in the face of the Fourteenth Amendment's explicit guarantee of "equal
protection" to all "persons" residing within a state's territory. 153 Despite
this textual command of individual equality, an enormous spatial gap in
constitutional coverage stubbornly persisted in America. In the late
nineteenth century, the Supreme Court infamously approved de jure racebased displacement. In Plessy v. Ferguson, the Court upheld a Louisiana
statute requiring separate but equal accommodations for white and black
railway passengers. 154 Plessy and other decisions of the long segregationist
era refused to acknowledge the damage produced by this territorial and

150. !d. at 96--97.
151. !d. at 96.
152. !d. at 97.
153. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
154. 163 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1896). From the time of emancipation, these and other local spatial
limitations were often supplemented with additional territorial restrictions. For example, immediately
after emancipation, exit from the system of racial-spatial discrimination was made difficult by the
passage, in both Northern and Southern states, of laws prohibiting or restricting the migration of newly
freed slaves. See NEUMAN, supra note 39, at 34-40 (discussing antebellum restrictions on black
migration).
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constitutional displacement. 155 Not until 1954, in Brown v. Board of
Education, did the Supreme Court formally recognize that the spatial
scheme of "separate but equal" stigmatized and unconstitutionally
delegitimized an entire race of people. 156 Of course, the formal rejection of
de jure displacement was merely a beginning. It would take a civil rights
era to further narrow the spatio-equality gap in which segregation thrived.
The effects of that gap persist to some extent even today.
2. Territory, Security and Loyalty
As noted in Part II, territoriality is intimately related to security and
national defense. As it was at the framing, securing the homeland from
external (and internal) enemies is one of the principal governance
functions of territoriality. As also noted earlier, territory both enforces
sovereign boundaries and protects public health and safety.
The operation of the prison at Guantanamo Bay is only the most recent
example of the territorial displacement of those perceived to be hostile to
the United States. During the winter of 1942, in the first months of
America's war with Japan, Americans of Japanese descent living on the
nation's Pacific Coast were subject to mass physical and constitutional
displacement. 157 The federal government adopted two forms of territorial
displacement to deal with what it apparently believed to be a disloyal
population. First, through a series of executive orders, followed later by
congressional approval, persons of Japanese descent were excluded from
areas near certain military assets. 158 This displacement was based on the
belief that the ancestry of those excluded made subversion and sabotage
likely. 159 The exclusion orders authorized officials to restrict the right of
persons to enter, leave, or remain in the designated exclusion zones.
Second, executive orders authorized mass evacuation and internment of
persons of Japanese and other ancestries. 160 The United States ultimately
ordered some 120,000 people of Japanese ancestry to report to assembly

155. For a comprehensive examination of the courts' treatment of racial segregation in the United
States, see KLARMAN, supra note 142.
156. 347 U.S. 483,488 (1954).
157. For accounts of the exclusion and internment policies and their effects, see ERIC L. MULLER,
AMERICAN INQUISITION: THE HUNT FOR JAPANESE AMERICAN DISLOYALTY IN WORLD WAR II
(2007); GREG ROBINSON, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: FDR AND THE INTERNMENT OF JAPANESE
AMERICANS (2d ed. 2003).
158. Exec. Order No. 9066,7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 25, 1942).
159. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216-17 (1944) (noting national defense
interests supporting exclusion orders).
160. See id. at 223-24 (upholding internment order).
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centers, from which they would ultimately be transferred to ten internment
camps located in the interior United States. 161
Although the displacement of persons of Japanese descent was
officially predicated upon national security concerns, exclusion and
internment demonstrated the perils of using territoriality as a weapon
during times of war. First, territory was used as a blunt means of
segregating persons deemed presumptively disloyal and dangerous. 162 We
now know that this presumption was based in part upon invidious racial
prejudice. 163 General Dewitt, one of the military commanders in charge of
administering the internments, summarized the military's insidious geostrategic objective: "[W]e must worry about the Japanese all the time until
he is wiped off the map." 164
Second, the effect of territorial exclusion and, in particular, internment
was to banish Japanese Americans from their communities and to render
them essentially invisible. Internment was a particularly harsh form of
displacement, imposed without benefit of even minimal legal process. The
internees, two-thirds of whom were American citizens, were transported
from assembly centers on the West Coast to relocation centers. 165 For two
to as many as four years, internees were forced to live in barbed-wireenclosed camps. 166 Military sentries patrolled camp perimeters. Internees
bunked in horse stalls, tar-paper shacks and other makeshift
accommodations. 167 They endured horrible conditions, including "brutal
heat and bitter cold, filth, dust and open sewers." 168 As a result of their
displacement, the internees lost most or all of their possessions, as well as
contacts with friends and neighbors in their communities. 169

161. United States v. Hohri, 482 U.S. 64 (1987).
162. Exclusion and internment were used in other countries as well, to similar effect. See Mona
Oikawa, Cartographies of Violence: Women, Memory, and the Subjects of the "Internment," 15 CAN.
J.L. & Soc'Y, No.2, at 39,40 (examining internment of Japanese Canadians).
163. See Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1417 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (finding that
government had withheld information regarding claim of military necessity and citing fmdings of
racial prejudice by Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians).
164. See WILLIAM M. WIECEK, 12 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN CONSTITUTION: THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1941-1953, at
348 (2006).
165. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 214,223-24 (upholding orders to report to assembly centers).
166. For a poignant description of the internment camps, see MICHl WEGL YN, YEARS OF INFAMY:
THE UNTOLD STORY OF AMERICA'S CONCENTRATION CAMPS (University of Washington Press 1996)
(1976).
167. Dinitia Smith, Photographs of an Episode That Lives in Irifamy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2006, at
El.
168. !d.
169. COMM'N ON WARTIME RELOCATION & INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL JUSTICE
DENIED 2-3 (1982).
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Constitutional challenges to both the exclusion and internment orders
ultimately reached the Supreme Court. Although the Court acknowledged
that heightened judicial scrutiny of the orders was warranted under the
Equal Protection Clause (in light of the government's explicit reliance on
race), it ultimately deferred to the concerns of military authorities and
upheld both the exclusion and internment orders. 170
Once again, the Constitution's equality guarantee had failed to protect
persons located within United States territory against an invidious form of
racial-spatial segregation. Years later, of course, America came to look
upon these particular constitutional displacements with a deep sense of
national shame. 171 Supreme Court precedents associated with the era,
although never expressly overruled, have been largely discredited. 172 As
we shall see, however, six decades later territory would once again
become a central means of defending the American homeland.

3. Migration and Membership
As noted in Part II, territorial sovereignty permits nations to set the
basic rules for entry, presence, and citizenship. Prior to the 1870s, the
United States had relatively open borders. This does not mean that state
and federal laws imposed no barriers to immigration; rather, as
immigration scholars have noted, what we now recognize as a system of
immigration laws did not yet exist. 173
Not surprisingly, there have always been some restrictions on
migration and territorial entry into the United States. Indeed, exclusionary
legislation was expressly authorized under the Articles of Confederation,
which denied "paupers, vagabonds and fugitives" the right to enter and
leave the confederated states. 174 Various migratory restrictions were
imposed following ratification of the Constitution. For example, early state
poor laws, modeled on British legislation, imposed internal restrictions on

170. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214 (upholding exclusion and internment orders); Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (upholding curfews and exclusion order).
171. Later, it became clear that the internees posed no security risk whatsoever. See Korematsu v.
United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (overturning Korernatsu's conviction based in part
on suppression of evidence). In 1988, Congress enacted a formal apology and provided for reparations
of $20,000 to each survivor of internment or their heirs. Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100383, 102 Stat. 904 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989b (2000)).
172. But see Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 351-52 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(suggesting current validity of decisions upholding exclusion and internment orders).
173. See NEUMAN, supra note 39, at 19-20 (addressing what the author calls the "open-borders
myth").
174. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV.
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the territorial entry and migration of certain persons-paupers, convicts,
freed Blacks, diseased persons, and other undesirables. 175 Dumping of
destitute persons by foreign countries was a particular concem. 176 The
courts initially upheld these state exclusions as valid exercises of local
police powers; only later did the Supreme Court hold that these laws
conflicted with Congress's power to control foreign commerce and
immigration. 177
Since the 1870s, Congress has held exclusive-and what is often
referred to as "plenary" or absolute-power over immigration. 178 Over the
years, Congress has used that extraordinary power to selectively include
and exclude aliens from various countries, generally without judicial
oversight. Throughout the nation's history, various groups have been
subjected to territorial exclusions and expulsions based upon factors such
as public disapproval, political unpopularity, homophobia, religious
discrimination, and blatant racism. 179 With regard to the latter, Congress
used its plenary power over immigration to enact the Chinese Exclusion
Act of 1882, and before that the Page Law of 1875, and the Naturalization
Act of 1870, which excluded the Chinese on racial, gender, and other
invidious grounds. 180 Territorial expulsions-deportations-have also
been used to displace and detain persons residing (both legally and
illegally) in the United States. During and particularly after World War I,
communists who were resident aliens were subject to territorial isolation
and expulsion. During the infamous Palmer Raids, thousands of suspected
communists and anarchists were arrested and detained within the United
States without trial. 181 Offices and homes of more than 200 resident aliens
were raided without warrants or probable cause; those seized were placed
on board a ship bound for the Soviet Union. 182 At various times in our
nation's history, territorial restrictions on ingress into and egress from the

175. See NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 39, at 21-40 (describing early
state and federal "immigration" laws).
176. See id. at 23-29 (describing experiences in Massachusetts and New York with paupers).
177. See Cleveland, supra note 38, at I 00-12 (discussing early immigration precedents).
178. Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional
Law ofImmigration, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1, 5-7 (1998) (discussing "plenary power" doctrine).
179. /d.at6-7.
180. See Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration Law, 105
COLUM. L. REv. 641 (2005) (examining Chinese immigration exclusions); see also ANDREW GYORY,
CLOSING THE GATE: RACE, POLITICS, AND THE CHINESE EXCLUSION ACT (1998).
181. See CHRISTOPHER M. FINAN, FROM THE PALMER RAIDS TO THE PATRIOT ACT: A HISTORY
OF THE FIGHT FOR FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA (2007).
182. SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES 42-44 (1999).
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United States have also been imposed on national security and ideological
grounds. 183
Numeric quotas have also been used to determine eligibility for
residence and citizenship in the United States. 184 For example, in 1921
Congress passed the Emergency Quota Act, which established national
quotas on immigration based upon national origin. 185 The quotas were
based on the number of foreign-born residents of each nationality who
were living within the United States as of the 1910 census. With passage
of the Immigration Act of 1924/ 86 a more complex quota plan replaced
this "emergency" system. Immigration quotas have been revised over the
years, and are still enforced. 187
In sum, entry into the political community of the United States has
always been determined with reference to territoriality-through the
recognition and enforcement of national borders. Early in the nation's
history, when national territorial borders were generally open, states and
localities filled gaps by excluding certain unwanted populations. Since the
middle of the nineteenth century, Congress has occupied the territorial
field relating to political membership. As bluntly described by Justice
Frankfurter, judicial deference to Congress's exercise of plenary power
over territorial ingress and egress has been nearly complete: "[W]hether
immigration laws have been crude and cruel, whether they have reflected
xenophobia in general or anti-Semitism or anti-Catholicism, the
responsibility belongs to Congress." 188
4. Early Urban Purification Measures
State and local police powers have historically been used to isolate and
exclude certain unwanted persons and marginal populations from
particular places and territories. At least since Plato urged the banishment
of beggars, officials have sought to expel beggars and homeless persons
from public spaces. 189 During the late nineteenth and early twentieth

183. Farber, supra note 115; see also Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention of
Aliens: Lessons from the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1995).
184. See generally JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN
NATIVISM, 1860-1925 (4th ed. 2002) (recounting political history surrounding adoption of quota
system).
185. Pub. L. No.5, 42 Stat. 5 (1921).
186. Pub. L. No. 139, 43 Stat. 153 (1924).
187. See Immigration and Naturalization Act, § 202(a), 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (current version at 8
U.S.C. § 1152 (2000)).
188. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 597 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
189. See II PLATO, LAWS, BOOK XI, at 465 (T.E. Page et a!. eds., R.G. Bury trans., Harvard
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centuries, isolation, quarantine, and other territorial measures were
routinely enforced against the homeless. 190 Homeless persons suspected of
carrying smallpox were often detained, isolated for sometimes lengthy
periods oftime, and forcibly vaccinated. 191
Governmental attempts to cleanse or purify public places have taken
broader forms as well. For example, the homeless and other vagrants have
historically been displaced through enforcement of public order (vagrancy
and anti-loitering) laws and discretionary police actions. 192 The poor and
homeless have not been the only unpopular groups subject to territorial
purification measures. Prostitutes, drug addicts, and other marginalized
persons have also been driven out of public places in order to cleanse them
for general public use. 193 The insane and the mentally ill have likewise
historically been subjected to displacement measures, including
involuntary commitment, institutionalization, and expulsion. 194
During the nineteenth and the better part of the twentieth centuries,
legal protections from this form of territorial displacement were essentially
non-existent. 195 Due process was not robustly protected, and police
operated with fairly wide discretion in public spaces. As a result, for a
substantial time in our nation's history local territories were largely under
the discretionary control of the police and other local officials. 196 In the
name of public health and safety, local officials were empowered to create
purified territories.
After World War II, commentators and courts began to look with
disfavor upon vagrancy and other laws that had been used to displace the
homeless and other marginal persons. 197 In the 1960s and 1970s, several
courts invalidated vagrancy laws under the Equal Protection Clause, the
Eighth Amendment's ban on "Cruel and Unusual Punishments," and the

University Press 1961) ("There shall be no beggar in our State; ... he shall be driven across the border
by the country-stewards, to the end that the land may be wholly purged of such a creature.").
190. See Harry Simon, Towns Without Pity: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis of Official
Efforts to Drive Homeless Persons From American Cities, 66 TuL. L. REv. 631, 638--40 (1992)
(discussing measures used to displace the homeless).
191. For a description of public health measures during this time, see WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE
PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (1996).
192. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 161 (1972) (reviewing history of antivagrancy laws targeting homeless). See generally LEONARD C. FELDMAN, CITIZENS WITHOUT
SHELTER: HOMELESSNESS, DEMOCRACY, AND POLITICAL EXCLUSION (2004 ).
193. Beckett & Herbert, supra note 32, at 13-16.
194. See generally FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION, supra note 117.
195. Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 603, 643--47
(1956).
196. Simon, supra note 190, at 638-39.
197. !d. at 642 & n.71.
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Due Process Clause. 198 Other courts during this time invalidated vagrancy
and loitering laws on the ground that they infringed liberties of travel or
movement. 199 In 1972, the Supreme Court condemned vagrancy and
loitering laws as "archaic classifications"; in striking down Jacksonville,
Florida's vagrancy ordinance on due process grounds, the Court
emphasized that such laws interfere with liberty of movement. 200 As we
shall see, local purification measures would take a different form in the
1980s and 1990s. Although contemporary territorial displacements of
vulnerable groups tend to be more subtle in form, the homeless and other
marginal groups continue to experience substantial interference with basic
liberties of public presence and movement.
5. Controlling Contagion Territorially
As discussed in Part II, preservation of public health and safety is a
critical governance function of territoriality. The territorial measures of
isolation and quarantine have deep historical roots. 201 Indeed, as Michel
Foucault has noted, one of government's earliest uses of spatiality was as a
means of separating healthy populations from those that were sick or
infirm. 202
Nineteenth century state laws excluded, quarantined, and detained
persons believed to be diseased and contagious at ports and other
borders. 203 In the early twentieth century, officials continued to segregate

198. See Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58, 62 (W.D.N.C. 1969) (invalidating criminal
vagrancy law), vacated, 401 U.S. 987 (1971); Goldman v. Knecht, 295 F. Supp. 897, 907 n.29 (D.
Colo. 1969) (holding that vagrancy statute invited selective enforcement and utilized unconstitutional
classifications based on poverty); Smith v. Hill, 285 F. Supp. 556, 560 (E.D.N.C. 1968) (same); see
also Decker v. Fillis, 306 F. Supp. 613, 617 (D. Utah 1969) (finding vagrancy ordinance invalid under
due process clause); Wheeler, 306 F. Supp. at 62 (holding that statute punished economic status
without mens rea).
199. See, e.g., People v. Berek, 300 N.E.2d 411, 415 (N.Y. 1973) (holding that loitering statute
violated Privileges and Immunities Clause by restricting free movement of citizens through state);
Hayes v. Mun. Ct. of Okla. City, 487 P.2d 974, 979 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971) (invalidating nighttime
wandering ordinance as unconstitutionally overbroad on ground that it infringed liberty of movement);
City of Portland v. James, 444 P.2d 554, 557-58 (Or. 1968) (invalidating loitering ordinance); see also
Decker v. Fillis, 306 F. Supp. 613, 617 (D. Utah 1969) (finding that enforcement of ordinance would
"certainly chill the liberty oflawful movement, presence and physical status").
200. Papachristou v. City ofJacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 161-62, 164 (1972).
201. See, e.g., Batlan, supra note 35, at 62-68 (discussing history of quarantine in United States).
Isolation and quarantine are somewhat distinct measures. Isolation refers to the physical segregation of
those diagnosed with a communicable disease. Quarantine is used to segregate healthy persons who
are believed to be contagious. Ernest A. Abbott, Law, Federalism, the Constitution, and Control of
Pandemic Flu, 9 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 185, 195 (2008).
202. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 117, at 199.
203. See NEUMAN, supra note 39, at 31-34 (discussing early quarantine laws).
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sick and contagious persons from the general public. The infected were
sometimes physically confined to the home; at other times those believed
to be a public health threat were confmed in facilities or displaced to
remote locations. In 1907, for example, New York officials forcibly (and
famously) placed Mary Mallon-"Typhoid Mary"-in isolation for life on
North Brother Island on New York's East River to prevent the spread of
typhoid fever. 204
Quarantines sometimes operated at the community-wide level. For
example, at the tum of the twentieth century San Francisco imposed
quarantine on all Chinese Americans after some persons of Chinese
descent were found to have contracted the plague?05 Affected persons
were not permitted to leave the Chinatown area for more than three
months. 206 Before and during this time, quarantine of vessels was also
common at ports in the United States and across the globe. 207 After the
worldwide flu pandemic of 1918-1919, many state legislatures drew up
detailed rules prohibiting all persons suspected of being infectious from
going to certain public places-including schools, theaters, and stores. 208
During these early periods, the principle of public necessity generally
provided the legal basis for isolation and quarantine orders. 209 Owing
generally to a lack of medical knowledge and expertise, courts were quite
reluctant to second-guess the medical judgments underlying public health
orders. So long as such orders were not arbitrary or unreasonable, they
were generally upheld. 210
By the middle of the twentieth century, however, governments had
begun to rely somewhat less on territorial displacement as a means of
protecting public health. Scientific advances in diagnosis, treatment, and
containment of disease allowed officials to use means other than

204. See JUDITH WALZER LEAVITT, TYPHOID MARY (1996).
205. Batlan, supra note 35, at 105-06.
206. See Joan B. Trauner, The Chinese as Medical Scapegoats in San Francisco, I870-I905, 57
CALIFORNIA HISTORY 70 (1978).
207. Batlan, supra note 35, at 63-67. The Supreme Court upheld New York's nineteenth century
exclusion of paupers arriving by ship in the city's port in Mayor ofNew Yorkv. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.)
102, 142 (1837), overruled in part by Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941).
208. See Richard J. Hatchett, Carter E. Mecher & Marc Lipsitch, Public Health Interventions and
Epidemic Intensity During the I9I8 Influenza Pandemic, 104 PRoc. OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF Scr.
7582 (2007), available at http://www.pnas.org/content/104/18/7582.full.pdf.
209. E.g., People v. Robertson, 134 N.E. 815, 817 (Ill. 1922).
210. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (upholding compulsory vaccination
of adults against smallpox). In addition, constitutional jurisprudence did not yet reflect robust
protection for liberty and due process. The Bill of Rights had not yet been applied to state and local
authorities. State constitutions also offered little protection, particularly in the face of widespread
confusion, panic, and public hysteria.
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widespread and lengthy quarantines. Courts were also beginning to more
rigorously review the basis and breadth of public health orders. In the
early 1950s, for example, tuberculosis patients mounted a successful
challenge to a public quarantine order. 211
With the discovery of HIV and AIDS in the early 1980s, however,
quarantine proposals resurfaced. 212 With little objective and scientific
knowledge about AIDS then available, some states enacted legislation
empowering executives to impose even large-scale quarantines if they
were deemed necessary to preserve the public health. 213 As the incidence
of AIDS rose, so did public hysteria. In the early 1980s, more than a
quarter of the American public held the opinion that HIV-infected
individuals should be quarantined. 214
In 1985, a New York state judge was incredulous that New York City
health officials did not quarantine all HIV-infected adults. 215 In 1986,
Lyndon LaRouche placed Proposition 64, the "Prevent AIDS Now"
Initiative, on the California ballot. 216 The measure would have required
statewide mandatory and reportable AIDS testing, banned anyone who
tested positive or had AIDS from working at or attending schools or foodhandling occupations, and imposed quarantine on persons infected by the
AIDS virus or ill with AIDS. Although Proposition 64 ultimately failed,
several cities did move to close gay bathhouses, limit employment
opportunities for AIDS patients, prohibit carriers from serving in the
military, and suspend the rights of HIV-infected children to attend public
schools. 217
Some public health efforts in the mid-1980s focused on regulation and
displacement of populations at high risk for AIDS. In 1987, New York
City officials placed a male prostitute who had been arrested sixty-six

211. See Moore v. Draper, 57 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1952).
212. Edward A. Pallone, Note, Preserving the Public Health: A Proposal to Quarantine
Recalcitrant AIDS Carriers, 68 B.U. L. REv. 441 (1988); see also Wendy E. Parmet, Aids and
Quarantine: The Revival of An Archaic Doctrine, 14 HOFSTRA L. REv. 53 (1985); Kathleen M.
Sullivan & Martha A. Field, AIDS and the Coercive Power of the State, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
139 (1988).
213. See Note, The Constitutional Rights of AIDS Carriers, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1274, 1281-83
(1986) (discussing public health response to AIDS).
214. !d. at 1281.
215. Judge in AIDS Hearing Asks About Quarantine for Adults, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1985, at B7.
216. See Robert Steinbrook & Kevin Roderick, Medical Experts Assail Initiative on AIDS:
Officials Dismiss Claims Made by Supporters of Larouche-Backed Prop. 64, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 3,
1986, at 3.
217. Note, supra note 213, at 1274; see also Steven H. Aden, A Tale of Two Cities in the Gay
Rights Kulturkarnpf: Are the Federal Courts Presiding Over the Balkanization ofAmerica?, 35 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 295, 307 (2000).
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times under a criminal quarantine order of indefinite duration. 218 Similar
orders were routinely issued against female prostitutes, on the ground that
it was reasonably likely they were afflicted with some contagious
condition. 219
The hysteria surrounding AIDS was also related to some degree to
public and official attitudes regarding homosexuality. 220 In such cases,
purification and contagion were actually closely related. Displacement
through quarantine signaled something beyond possible contagion. The
territorial response to AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases indicated
that both public health and individual morality were at issue. In sum, in
these instances territory was used not only for physical security, but also
as a type of normative communication regarding deviance.
With regard to diseases like AIDS, scientific advances have lessened
official resort to blunt territorial measures. But as we shall see, proposals
to isolate and quarantine infected persons have now surfaced in response
to threats of bioterrorism and highly resistant viruses. Territorial measures
remain critical aspects of governmental planning for future epidemics and
contagions.
B. Five Contemporary Geographies ofDisplacement

This part turns to several contemporary legal Geographies of
Displacement, all of which are frrmly rooted in the foregoing antecedents.
Today's public order and safety challenges--enemy aliens captured in the
global war on terrorism, unauthorized (illegal) immigration, released sex
offenders, persistent homelessness, and public health threats from more
virulent strains of disease-have given rise to distinct and, in some cases,
still-developing Geographies of Displacement. As discussed in the
previous part, antecedent displacements-racial segregation, race-based
internment, restrictions on local migration, some discretionary public
policing measures, and use of large-scale quarantines as initial responses
to contagion-have been largely condemned or criticized. But
contemporary Geographies of Displacement have produced new questions
regarding constitutional scope and exposed new threats to constitutional

218. Man Exposed to AIDS Put Under Quarantine, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1987, at B4.
219. See, e.g., Ex parte Clemente, 215 P. 698 (Cal. 1923) (holding that quarantine of prostitute
was justified on grounds of necessity); Ex parte Dayton, 199 P. 548 (Cal. 1921) (upholding jailing of
woman pending examination owing to suspicion she was a prostitute).
220. SUSAN CRADDOCK, CITY OF PLAGUES: DISEASE, POVERTY, AND DEVIANCE IN SAN
FRANCISCO 3 (2000) (observing that officials sometimes use their power to regulate disease to define
deviance).
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liberty. As we shall see, the Constitution speaks in rather uncertain terms
regarding the government's authority to create the contemporary
Geographies of Displacement.

1. The Geography ofJustice
Territoriality has been a critical element of the Bush administration's
prosecution of the global war on terrorism. In the name of national
security-protecting the homeland-the administration has strategically
constructed a unique Geography of Justice. 221 Policies regarding the
detention and treatment of persons labeled "enemy combatants" have been
expressly premised on territorial displacement. Essentially, rather than
intern detainees on United States soil, the government has sought to effect
their territorial, legal, and constitutional displacement by detaining them
beyond U.S. borders.
Detention of enemy aliens at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, is without
question the most visible part of this new Geography of Justice. The Bush
administration's decision to hold detainees at Guantanamo was explicitly
premised on the idea that the Constitution and laws of the United States do
not apply outside U.S. territory. 222 At least, the administration believed,
constitutional guarantees of due process and habeas corpus would not
extend to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
There seemed to be both factual and legal support for this
constitutional position. According to a lease agreement, Cuba retains
"'ultimate sovereignty"' with regard to the island. 223 If, as earlier
precedents had suggested, national borders were determinative of or
defined national sovereignty, then detainees outside the United States
would have no recourse to the Constitution. 224 The Guantanamo Bay

221. See generally Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, supra note 14 (discussing importance of
territory in recent Supreme Court terrorism cases).
222. See JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005); see also JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTANAMO AND THE ABUSE OF
PRESIDENTIAL POWER (2006).
223. Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, supra note 14, at 2540 (quoting lease, and discussing
lease and U.S relationship to Guantanamo territory).
224. Previous wartime precedents appeared to support the administration's position. See, e.g.,
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 778 (1950) (noting that habeas corpus protection did not apply
to prisoners because "at no relevant time were [they] within any territory over which the United States
is sovereign, and the scenes of their offense, their capture, their trial and their punishment were all
beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any court of the United States"). But see Boumediene v. Bush, 128
S. Ct. 2229, 2257-58 (2008) (rejecting argument that Eisentrager established a formal territorial test
regarding the scope of habeas corpus jurisdiction).
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Naval Base itself, however, has been under the "complete jurisdiction and
control" ofthe United States since 1903.225
In these somewhat ambiguous circumstances, the United States
government brought prisoners to Guantanamo from Iraq, Afghanistan, and
elsewhere around the world. It steadfastly insisted that the habeas statutes
and the Constitution did not apply there because the United States was not
sovereign in the territory. 226 In essence, outside United States territory, the
President asserted absolute legal dominion over suspected terrorists.
Guantanamo was thus expressly conceived as a law-free zone; as one
lawyer for the Bush administration suggested, it was "the legal equivalent
of outer space. "227
The question was thus whether, by simply placing 400 or so prisoners a
mere 400 miles from the coast of the United States, the government could
effectively make them disappear. Despite several legal setbacks, most
notably those discussed immediately below in the Supreme Court, the
United States government has been largely successful in denying the
Guantanamo detainees access to justice and the benefits of the rule of law
by territorially displacing them. 228 The most important-and as yet not
fully and finally answered-questions in the detainee litigation are
expressly territorial: Where, precisely, does the writ of habeas corpus (and
perhaps other constitutional guarantees) actually run? Can the United
States avoid constitutional and other legal constraints and processes by
holding detainees outside United States territory?229
To fully appreciate the continued significance of territory in the fight
against terrorism and more generally, let us briefly review the detainee
cases recently decided by the Supreme Court. In Rasul v. Bush, the
Supreme Court held that alien Guantanamo detainees captured in
Afghanistan and Pakistan were entitled to statutory habeas corpus review

225. Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, supra note 14, at 2540. The United States pays rent
under the lease. Under its terms, Cuba could not terminate the agreement without U.S. consent. !d. at
2537.
226. See id. at 2540 ("[T]he U.S. position was and remains that [Cuban sovereignty] disposes of
any constitutional claims of the detainees.").
227. John Barry et a!., The Roots of Torture, NEWSWEEK, May 24, 2004, at 30 (quoting former
Bush administration lawyer). The position that Guantanamo Bay was outside the sovereign control of
the United States preceded the events of September 11,2001. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2252.
228. Only very recently have some detainees been granted access to judicial process and achieved
some success in challenging their detentions. See William Glaberson, Judge Declares Five Detainees
Held Illegally, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2008, at Al.
229. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 8 (analyzing recent habeas and detention cases); see also
James E. Pfander, The Limits of Habeas Jurisdiction and the Global War on Terror, 91 CORNELL L.
REv. 497 (2006) (same).
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under then-existing laws. 230 Rejecting the basic premise of the Bush
administration's territorial strategy in the war on terrorism, Rasul held that
control over the island territory was sufficient to support habeas
jurisdiction over detainees' claims. 231 Rasul did not express any opinion,
however, regarding whether habeas review was required under the
Constitution, thus opening the door to future congressional restrictions. 232
The Rasul Court also declined to opine whether its habeas ruling extended
to aliens held in territories in other places throughout the world. 233 In these
critical respects, the Court avoided the general question of the
Constitution's territorial scope.
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a plurality found that the Executive had the
authority to detain, without resort to criminal process, an American citizen
captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan-first at Guantanamo and then
later at American naval brigs. 234 But the plurality also said that as a United
States citizen, Hamdi was entitled to some form of due process regardless
of location, and that the process used to determine Hamdi's status as an
"'enemy combatant"' was constitutionally deficient. 235 Thus, as a United
States citizen, Hamdi was entitled to at least some minimal due process
protections, including notice and an opportunity to rebut the government's
allegations before a neutral decision maker. 236 At least with regard to
American citizens and in certain limited terms, the Constitution appeared
to follow the flag to Guantanamo Bay.
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Court held that an enemy alien detained at
Guantanamo could not be tried under the Bush administration's
framework for military tribunals, as those tribunals failed to comply with
international laws of war and procedures required under federal statutes
for courts martial. 237 Like Rasul, Hamdan rested largely on statutory

230. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
231. See id. at 481-82 (noting common law rule that habeas ran to territories under control of the
Crown).
232. The Court did, however, hint at a constitutional habeas holding in a footnote. See id. at 483
n.l5.
233. !d. at 484. See generally Baher Azmy, Rasul v. Bush and the Intra-Territorial Constitution,
62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 369 (2007) (discussing scope of Rasul decision); Elizabeth A. Wilson,

The War on Terrorism and "The Water's Edge": Sovereignty, "Territorial Jurisdiction," and the
Reach of the US. Constitution in the Guantanamo Detainee Litigation, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 165
(2006) (same).
234. 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion).
235. Id. at 510.
236. !d. at 533.
237. 548 U.S. 557, 670 (2006).
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grounds. 238 Thus, the Court once again avoided questions regarding the
Constitution's territorial scope or reach.
Shortly after Hamdan was decided, Congress presented its own answer
regarding territorial scope or jurisdiction. Overruling Rasul, the Military
Commissions Act of 2006239 purported to strip federal courts of habeas
jurisdiction to hear detention challenges by enemy aliens held at
Guantanamo-and elsewhere outside United States territorial
boundaries.Z40
The issue was now at last joined: Assuming it had done so in the
Military Commissions Act, could Congress and President Bush effectively
suspend the writ of habeas corpus as to aliens detained at Guantanamo
Bay? The Constitution permits suspension of the writ of habeas corpus
only "in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion."241 In a case involving several
Guantanamo detainees who had been designated enemy combatants, the
District of Columbia Circuit held that the Military Commissions Act
stripped the federal courts of the statutory habeas jurisdiction that the
Supreme Court had recognized in Rasul; the court further held that this
denial of habeas review to Guantanamo detainees satisfied any
constitutional requirements. 242 The court's constitutional holding was
based on three basic propositions: (1) the Suspension Clause only protects
the right of habeas as it existed in 1789, (2) the common law in 1789 did
not provide any habeas right to aliens held by the government outside the
sovereign's territory, and (3) Guantanamo is outside United States
territory for constitutional purposes. 243
The Bush Administration was once again rebuffed in the Supreme
Court. While conceding that the scope of the Suspension Clause is limited,
at a minimum, to its scope as of 1789 and that Guantanamo was located
outside United States territory, the Court, in Boumediene v. Bush and Al
Odah v. United States, nevertheless held that alien Guantanamo detainees
are constitutionally entitled to pursue writs of habeas corpus. 244 Writing

238. The Court held that the military commission violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice
and the Geneva Conventions. !d. at 567.
239. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
240. !d. § 7, 120 Stat. 2600, 2635. The Act, which amends the earlier Detainee Treatment Act of
2005, allows detainees to challenge the fact of their detention, although not the conditions thereof, in
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. !d.§ 3, 120 Stat. 2600,2622.
241. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 9, cl. 2. Article I, Section 9, clause 2 of the Constitution provides that
"[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." !d.
242. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981,990 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev'd, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
243. !d. at 988-92.
244. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
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for the majority, Justice Kennedy first determined that Congress had in
fact suspended the writ of habeas corpus. 245 After surveying the
geographic scope of the writ as of 1789, Justice Kennedy announced that
while "informative," the history was not dispositive. 246 The majority
rejected the government's core argument-that alien combatants held at
Guantanamo were not entitled to the writ because Cuba, not the United
States, was legally sovereign there. 247 The Court stated that in discerning
the geographic scope of the writ, it was appropriate "to inquire into the
objective degree of control the Nation asserts over foreign territory."248 As
it had in Rasul, the Court noted that the United States exercises complete
jurisdiction and control over the base at Guantanamo, and "maintains de
facto sovereignty over this territory."249 The majority interpreted Reid v.
Covert, 250 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 251 and other precedents that had
seemingly adopted a narrower and more formalist view of constitutional
scope to support the proposition that the geographic scope of the writ
ought to be based upon the particular circumstances and "practical
necessities" of each case. 252
Eschewing a formal legal sovereignty test, Justice Kennedy announced
a functional test for determining the geographic scope of the writ (and
possibly other provisions in the Constitution). 253 In addition to practical
concerns relating to access to the writ, the Court held that three factors are
relevant in determining the geographic scope of the writ: "(1) the
citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process
through which that status determination was made; (2) the nature of the
sites where apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the
practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner's entitlement to the
writ. "254 Given that the status of the detainees in Boumediene and Al Odah
was in dispute, there had been no trial by military commission, the United
States exercised absolute and indefmite control over the naval base at
Guantanamo, the detainees were isolated in a secure facility, and

245. !d. at 2244.
246. Id. at 2249.
247. !d. at 2252.
248. !d.
249. Id. at 2253.
250. 351 U.S. 487 (1956).
251. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
252. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2255.
253. !d. at 2258 ("Nothing in Eisentrager says that de jure sovereignty is or has ever been the only
relevant consideration in determining the geographic reach of the Constitution or of habeas corpus.").
254. Id. at 2259.
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adjudication of the writ would cause no friction with Cuba itself, the Court
held that the writ applied to the detainees. 255
Critical to the Court's adoption of this multifaceted functional
approach was the Bush administration's attempted manipulation of
territory and its effect on the constitutional separation of powers. In
particular, the Court was concerned that permitting the government to
avoid constitutional constraints through what amounted to creative leasing
of territory would permit the "political branches to govern without legal
constraint."256 In the most poignant passage of his opinion, Justice
Kennedy elaborated:
Our basic charter cannot be contracted away like this. The
Constitution grants Congress and the President the power to
acquire, dispose of and govern territory, not the power to decide
when and where its terms apply. Even when the United States acts
outside its borders, its powers are not "absolute and unlimited" but
are subject ''to such restrictions as are expressed in the
Constitution." Abstaining from questions involving formal
sovereignty and territorial governance is one thing. To hold the
political branches have the power to switch the Constitution on or
off at will is quite another. The former position reflects this Court's
recognition that certain matters requiring political judgments are
best left to the political branches. The latter would permit a striking
anomaly in our tripartite system of government, leading to a regime
in which Congress and the President, not this Court, say "what the
law is. "257
Exercising what it believed to be its judicial prerogative, the Court held
that the Suspension Clause "has full effect at Guantanamo Bay."258 It
further held that the government had failed to provide an adequate
substitute for habeas review.Z 59
As strong as the majority's statements and convictions appear, the
contours of the functional approach are far from clear. 260 The decision is
based to a large degree upon the unique status of Guantanamo and the

255. Id.at2260-62.
256. !d. at 2259.
257. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15,44 (1885);
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
258. !d. at 2262.
259. Id. at 2274.
260. See Neuman, supra note 11 (discussing some of the important questions regarding
constitutional scope left open by Boumediene ).
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United States' de facto sovereignty over this territory. What about other
territories and locations? Aliens detained by the executive outside United
States territorial borders and in places not under exclusive and indefinite
United States control would appear to remain beyond the geographic reach
of the Suspension Clause. 261 How much "control" is necessary to give rise
to the writ? What specific constitutional rights do aliens detained in the
covered territories and jurisdictions actually enjoy? What specific issues
may they raise with regard to the conditions of their confinement?262
Finally, what, if anything, does the Court's opinion suggest with regard to
constitutional provisions other than the Suspension Clause? Are these too
now subject to the functional standard for determining geographic scope?
Of course, Guantanamo is merely the most visible and contested
evidence of the developing Geography of Justice. A limited number of
detainees have been more radically displaced. Several reports have
indicated that the Central Intelligence Agency has been operating secret
detention facilities, or "black sites," in various places throughout the
world. 263 In these facilities, persons are ghost detainees-literally the
disappeared. As little as we know about treatment and process at
Guantanamo Bay, we know even less about activities at these secret
detention facilities. Certainly these special detainees have received no
trials or other legal process. Given the lack of transparency and the
seeming absence of any legal framework, the duration of detention is even
more uncertain than it is for the Guantanamo detainees. Until they are
released or moved to some more visible territory, these detainees remain
outside the reach of the Constitution and the rule oflaw.
Still other detainees have found themselves in law-free zones by virtue
of a United States policy known as "extraordinary rendition."264 Margaret
Satterthwaite has defined this practice as "the transfer of an individual,
without the benefit of a legal proceeding in which the individual can
challenge the transfer, to a country where he or she is at risk of torture."265

261. See Fallon & Metzger, supra note 8, at 2056.
262. See Paracha v. Bush, 374 F. Supp. 2d 118 (D.D.C. 2005) (raising treatment and other issues
relating to detention).
263. See Stephen Grey & Doreen Carvajal, Secret Prisons in 2 Countries Held Qaeda Suspects,
Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2007, at Al2 (reporting confirmation of clandestine prisons in
Romania and Poland); see also Mark Mazzetti & David S. Cloud, C.IA. Held Qaeda Leader In Secret
Prison for Months, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2007, at A9.
264. Satterthwaite, supra note 13, at 1336.
265. !d. As one unnamed United States official bluntly explained: "We don't kick the [expletive]
out of them. We send them to other countries so they can kick the [expletive] out of them." Dana Priest
& Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations: 'Stress and Duress' Tactics Used
on Terrorism Suspects Held in Secret Overseas Facilities, WASH. POST, Dec. 26,2001, at AI.
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Under the rendition program, persons have been seized by CIA agents and
other United States personnel and forcibly removed to other countries,
where some claim to have been tortured. Owing to claims that trials would
divulge state secrets or place national security at risk, no person subject to
rendition has thus far been afforded an opportunity to obtain a remedy in
the United States. 266
President Bush's public remarks indicate that he believes current
United States law authorizes rendition of suspected terrorists to territories
abroad? 67 Like detainees held in secret detention facilities, those rendered
to another country's territory for interrogation purposes have no habeas or
other rights to judicial process. 268 Certain treaties expressly prohibit the
practice of rendition, at least without following certain safeguards?69 The
Bush administration has taken the position that these treaties, like the
Constitution itself, do not extend beyond the territorial boundaries of the
United States. 270
Although practices like rendition are not entirely new, largely as a
result of the United States' war on terrorism a distinct Geography of
Justice has recently been mapped through governmental manipulation of
territory. The concept of the "homeland" is itself an integral part of a geostrategy for national defense. Guantanamo is a central element of that
geographic strategy, but it is only one part. Territory has been strategically
manipulated to create legal black holes and black sites. At the same time,
the United States government has taken the position that it is empowered
to detain some enemy combatants within United States borders
indefinitely. 271

266. A few rendered detainees have sought recourse in court after their release, but to no avail.
See Adam Liptak, U.S. Appeals Court Upholds Dismissal of Abuse Suit Against C.IA., Saying Secrets
Are At Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2007, at A6; see also El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th

Cir. 2007) (dismissing German national's claims against the CIA for injuries incurred during
extraordinary rendition on grounds of state secrets privilege).
267. President George W. Bush, President Discusses Creation of Military Tribunals to Try
Suspected Terrorists (Sept. 6, 2006), available at http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/
20060906-3.html. The United States has not acted alone in making these detainees disappear. A recent
report by the European Parliament concluded that many European governments cooperated, either
passively or actively, in the U.S. rendition program. The report indicates that at least 1245 CIAoperated flights passed through Europe's airspace or stopped at its airports. Brian Knowlton, Report
Rejects European Denial of C.I.A. Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2006, at A15 (detailing European
involvement).
268. Many treaties, some to which the United States is a signatory, prohibit torture and other
mistreatment of detainees. Most of these are not self-executing and thus cannot be enforced in a court
oflaw. Satterthwaite, supra note 13, at 1365 .
269. The treaties are discussed id. at 13 50-79.
270. Id. at 1358-59.
271. A sharply divided Fourth Circuit recently held the government has the power to detain
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The effect of all this territorial manipulation on individual liberty has
been pronounced. Despite several Supreme Court rulings in their favor,
detainees have been held for several years with minimal or no due process,
limited access to counsel and other support, and subjected to indeterminate
terms of isolation and confinement. Only recently has the Supreme Court
directly addressed issues of constitutional scope and territoriality relating
to these detentions. As noted, the ultimate effects the Court's decisions
may have on the contours of the Geography of Justice are not yet clear.
The political branches are proceeding with military commission
proceedings, a process that may drag on for several more years. 272 And
even in the event of an acquittal, it is far from certain that any former
enemy combatant will actually be released. 273
2. The Geography ofMembership
As noted in Part II, geographic boundaries identify and designate
sovereign territories. Sovereigns are of course entitled to regulate access to
their territories and, with such access, rights to legal citizenship,
membership in political communities, and access to certain benefits and
privileges. 274 Governments do this by drawing and, as necessary, redrawing territorial borders and boundaries.
The manner in which a nation exercises this territorial power speaks in
some sense to its commitment to openness and opportunity. 275 Despite
certain historical episodes of exclusion and expulsion, discussed earlier,
the United States has generally taken great pride in the maintenance of
relatively open borders. That commitment has been strained of late by
controversy surrounding the presence of approximately twelve million
illegal aliens within U.S. territory. 276

indefinitely a person lawfully resident in the United States, so long as sufficient process has been
provided in determining his status as an enemy combatant. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th
Cir. 2008) (en bane), cert. granted, 2008 WL 4326485.
272. William Glaberson, Detainee Convicted on Terrorism Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2008, at
A19.
273. See Ross Tuttle, Comment, Rigged Trials at Gitmo, THE NATION, Mar. 10, 2008, at 4
(suggesting possibility that no acquittals would be allowed and that detainees who were victorious
would not be released).
274. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (discussing political membership and
territorial borders).
275. LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY
MEMBERSHIP (2006).
276. JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CENTER, SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES (Mar. 7, 2006), http://pewhispanic.
org/reports/report. php?Report1D=61.
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America has a complex and, at present, dysfunctional immigration
system. Mexican and other immigrants continue to cross the border.
Meanwhile, a volatile combination of economic uncertainty, racism,
demagoguery, nationalism, partisanship, and legitimate concern for the
rule oflaw has made illegal or undocumented immigration one of the most
hotly contested political issues of the day. A deeply divided Congress has
been able to accomplish next to nothing in terms of substantive
immigration reform. 277
This failure to produce comprehensive reform has led to reliance on
more blunt forms of territoriality. The most obvious example is
congressional authorization for the construction of a massive fence along
the nation's 2100-mile southern border. The Secure Fence Act of 2006
authorizes construction of the border fence-more than 300 miles of
which have already been built-and appropriates $1.2 billion for an array
of border protection measures. 278 In addition to fence construction, the
appropriated funds can also be used for vehicle barriers, lighting, and
surveillance equipment (a virtual fence). 279 Whether ultimately effective or
not, the border fence will certainly be a potent symbol of territorial
defense and exclusion.
Although we tend to assume that legal borders are physically fixed by
geography, this is not actually the case. Both federal and local laws
expressly or functionally alter the location of the border. For example, by
law and regulation federal immigration officials have established
immigration borders within the United States. As Ayelet Shachar has
explained, federal officials have legally shifted the location of the border,
such that many aliens already within the country are treated as if they
never crossed the cartographic border at all. 280 More generally, several
recent changes in immigration law and policy contract and extend the
border in a manner that extinguishes rights (such as due process) that

277. The most recent legislative efforts in this regard faltered. See Randal C. Archibold, Bill Dies.
Views Divide and Immigrants Work On, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2007, at AI (describing fallout from
Senate failure to advance immigration bill).
278. Pub. L. No. 109-367, 120 Stat. 2638 (2006). According to the Department of Homeland
Security, Customs and Border Control, more than half of the 670 miles of fencing were completed as
of June 2008. See U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, SBI
Timeline (Nov. 10, 2008) http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/sbi/about_sbi/sbi_timeline.
xml. For an updated map of construction, see http://www.cbp.gov/Iinkhandler/cgov/newsroom/
highlights/fence_map.ctt/fence_ map.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2009).
279. See Randal C. Archibold, 28-Mile Virtual Fence Is Rising Along the Border, N.Y. TIMES,
June 26, 2007, at A12 (describing technological aspects of the Secure Border Initiative).
280. See Shachar, supra note 16, at 167 (referring to the "shifting border of inunigration
regulation") (emphasis omitted).
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would normally accrue to those physically present within United States
territory. 281 As Shachar notes, "the border itself has become a moving
barrier, a legal construct that is not tightly fixed to territorial
benchmarks."282 In this instance, the malleability of the border imperils
certain domestic individual liberties by de-spatializing them.
Congress's failure to produce a more systematic plan has also caused a
proliferation of local territorial measures. 283 In a certain sense, this has
produced another inward movement of the country's territorial borders.
Increasingly, local communities are seeking to determine and adjudicate
the lawfulness of presence within their own territories. According to the
National Conference of State Legislatures, 240 laws relating to
immigration were enacted by state legislatures in 2007-triple the number
enacted in 2006. 284 Many localities across the country have also enacted
immigration measures in the past few years. 285
Many recently enacted state laws and local ordinances are somewhat
reminiscent of early state exclusions of paupers, vagabonds, and other
unwelcome persons. The specific use of territoriality has varied by
locality. For example, some localities have threatened to enforce
trespassing laws against illegal immigrants? 86 Thus, the mere presence in
the community of anyone without proper documentation would be deemed
a criminal offense? 87 Other localities, distressed that day laborers (many,
if not most, of whom are presumed to be undocumented aliens) occupy
parking lots, street comers, and other public places as they seek work,
have sought to remove them through expulsion ordinances or official
harassment. 288 Street comers and parking lots may not seem worthy of this
sort of effort and attention. To those who gather there, however, these
places are critical to pursuit of livelihood and presence in the
community? 89 Indeed, expulsion from these local places makes it difficult

281. !d. at 169 (noting new distinction between "entry" and "admission," expedited removal
procedures, and collection of biometric information).
282. !d. at 167. See also Bosniak, supra note 55, at 403 (noting malleability of"the border").
283. See generally Huntington, supra note 20 (examining local immigration measures and the
intersection oflocal and federal authority in immigration context).
284. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, IMMIGRANT POLICY PROJECT, 2007 ENACTED
STATE LEGISLATION RELATED TO IMMIGRANTS AND IMMIGRATION (2008).
285. Huntington, supra note 20, at 803-04.
286. See Belluck, supra note 18.
287. Commentators have noted the increased reliance on criminal justice models in addressing
immigration. See, e.g., Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign
Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006).
288. See Fernanda Santos, Village Officials Harassed Day Laborers, Judge Rules, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 21, 2006, at B5 (invalidating policy of discriminatory treatment).
289. See Steven Greenhouse, On Dusty Corner, Laborers Band Together for More Pay, N.Y.
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if not impossible for some to remain in the community at large. That, of
course, may be precisely the point.
Many states and localities have adopted broader territorial measures.
These laws and ordinances are designed to prevent unlawful immigrants
from being present in local communities and to restrict their access to
local largesse. 290 In general, these laws prohibit the employment and
harboring of undocumented persons. 291 Under hundreds of recently
enacted state and local ordinances, landlords found to be renting space to
improperly documented aliens typically may be fined; businesses found to
be hiring illegal aliens may be penalized and possibly shut down; and legal
employees may sue businesses for employment lost during any
shutdown?92 These laws generally require business owners, landlords, and
local officials to verify, at their substantial peril, the immigration status of
all those seeking to live and work in the community. 293
These state and local laws are efforts to address problems purportedly
related to illegal immigration, including higher crime rates and lower
property values. The apparent hope is that by controlling access to places
like residences and workplaces, local territories will become illegalimmigrant-free zones. The nature and character of these local reforms
raise the concern, however, that all aliens in the community will feel
unwelcome and will perhaps be forced to move elsewhere. 294 Employers
and landlords-who are hardly expert at determining immigration statusare now being called upon to make hiring and rental decisions that may
disfavor aliens as a class. Constant official suspicion and surveillance may
also inhibit even legal aliens from requesting services or appearing in
public places. 295 Meanwhile, the federal government has stepped up its
own immigration enforcement efforts, conducting numerous well-

TIMES, July 14,2006, at A1 (describing effort by day laborers to remain on comer in one community).

290. See supra Part II.B.4.
291. American Civil Liberties Union, Local Anti-Immigrant Ordinance Cases, http://www.aclu.
org/immigrants/discrim/27848res20070105.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2008) (ACLU website
collecting information on pending challenges). See, e.g., Hazleton Ordinance 2006-18, supra note 21;
Hazleton Ordinance 2006-13, supra note 21.
292. American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 291.
293. Id.
294. See Nina Bernstein, Promise of ID Cards is Followed by Peril of Arrest for Illegal
Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2007, at B1 (reporting effects of federal crackdown on immigrant
community).
295. Responding to such concerns, localities like New Haven, Connecticut, have expressed a
willingness to accept displaced aliens, without regard to citizenship status. Jennifer Medina, New
Haven Welcomes Immigrants, Legal or Not, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2007, at Bl. California, meanwhile,
has prohibited localities from enacting territorial defense measures like those prevalent in other states.
See Randal C. Archibold, State Strikes Balance on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2007, at A27.
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publicized raids of homes and businesses. 296 This has led to substantial
disruption and fear in many communities across the United States?97
Aliens, of course, have no constitutional right to enter the United
States. As the Supreme Court has said, "[a]dmission of aliens to the
United States is a privilege granted by the sovereign."298 The Constitution
does not expressly preclude a territorial lockdown. Thus, no alien may
legally challenge the general militarization of the United States border, or
demand membership in the political community?99 Nor, given the federal
government's plenary power over immigration, would it appear that
challenges to agency alterations of the border have any real chance of
success. 300 (Of course, whether these measures are normatively attractive
as aspects of the nation's immigration policy is another question.)
Recently enacted state and local immigration measures may have
profound effects on the liberty of persons already present (some for many
years) within the United States. The question is what sort of protection the
Constitution affords to those who are subjected to these local territorial
displacements.
Thus far, threats to enforce trespass laws seem to have amounted to just
that-mere threats. At this point, a few courts have addressed the
constitutionality of recently adopted local territorial measures. In extreme
cases, aggressive efforts to sweep unlawful residents from the streets,
sidewalks and parking lots have been judicially condemned. For example,
a group of laborers in one New York community successfully challenged
their displacement from public territories under the Equal Protection
Clause. 301 Officials in that case were found to have aggressively targeted
day laborers, many of them legal residents, for discriminatory treatment
over the course of several months. The case is unusual in several respects,
including the overwhelming evidence of systemic official harassment. 302

296. Steven Greenhouse, Immigrant Crackdown Upends a Slaughterhouse's Work Force, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 12, 2007, at Al. Federal officials have engaged in aggressive sweeps in "sanctuary"

localities, arresting and deporting illegal residents. See Jennifer Medina, Arrests of 31 in U.S. Sweep
Bring Fear in New Haven, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2007, at Bl.
297. See Samuel G. Freedman, Immigrants Find Solace After Storm of Arrests, N.Y. TIMES, July
12, 2008, at A9 (reporting disruption and fear after immigration raids and arrests).
298. United States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950).
299. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,378 (1971) (regulation of aliens is "constitutionally
entrusted to the Federal Government").
300. Agency measures that define or alter internal borders are discussed infra Part IV.C.2.
301. Doe v. Village of Mamaroneck, 462 F. Supp. 2d 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that day
laborers had demonstrated official campaign of police harassment).
302. !d. at 535-39 (describing systemic police harassment).
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Subtler forms of official harassment-like frequent patrols and
surveillance-are likely to go unchecked. 303
Day laborers have also successfully invoked the First Amendment in
certain limited contexts. Insofar as access to traditional public forums like
sidewalks and streets are concerned, the First Amendment provides
limited protection against territorial displacement. 304 Thus, for example, a
Redondo Beach, California, ordinance that prohibited day laborers from
soliciting work in most public places was invalidated on First Amendment
grounds. 305 Many less sweeping measures, including limits on location or
place as opposed to outright prohibitions, would likely survive
constitutional scrutiny.
Thus, day laborers have enjoyed some limited successes in challenging
local territorial displacements. But intentional and aggressive official
harassment and sweeping bans on the public presence of day laborers are
indeed exceptional. Contemporary territorial displacements are often far
more subtle in form. In the ordinary case, courts must labor to bend and
stretch the Constitution to address even something as fundamental as the
right to be present in public places for the purposes of offering one's labor
to the public. 306 The Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment are
rather unwieldy tools for combating these and other local territorial
displacements.
More comprehensive local territorial reforms, including those that
regulate employment of aliens, were recently called into question after a
federal district court invalidated several Hazleton, Pennsylvania,
ordinances. 307 In the closely watched case, the court held that Hazleton's
housing and employment ordinances were preempted by federal laws. 308

303. As well, unofficial acts of hostility as well as attitudes of neighbors and community members
may establish territorial controls beyond the reach of the Constitution and laws.
304. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983) (describing
standards for determining whether government has unconstitutionally excluded a speaker from a
forum).
305. Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 475 F. Supp. 2d 952,
966 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (invalidating ordinance banning street and sidewalk solicitation by day laborers
on First Amendment grounds).
306. Moreover, these few reported victories mask some rather significant practical concerns. It is a
particularly heavy burden for those with little means, little or no knowledge regarding the local justice
system, and a general (and understandable) wariness of local authorities to challenge these sorts of
territorial measures in the courts. In many cases, simply moving to another territory may be a far more
attractive alternative.
307. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007). See Julia Preston, Judge
Voids Ordinances on Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2007, at Al4 (describing decision as a
"resounding legal blow" to local efforts to regulate immigration).
308. See Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 519, 523, 529. For an analysis of preemption doctrine, see
generally Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law ofPreemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085 (2000).
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The court also held that the ordinances failed to provide employers,
employees, and landlords with adequate notice and opportunity for hearing
prior to deprivation of their respective interests, in violation of the Due
Process Clause. 309 Specifically, the court held that the ordinances were
vague with regard to what sort of documentation an employer or landlord
must review, and an employee must provide, in order to comply with the
law.3Io
While it may appear to be a serious blow to local efforts to create
undocumented-free zones, the Hazleton decision does not actually extend
substantial constitutional protection to undocumented aliens in local
communities. Although the district court noted on several occasions that
illegal aliens were not stripped of all constitutional protections,311 this
merely establishes constitutional jurisdiction; it does not establish the
scope or substance of any liberties aliens might possess. 312 The Hazleton
decision rests primarily upon structural principles of preemption and
federalism, rather than substantive liberty guarantees. Other courts,
including the Supreme Court, may of course take a different view of the
preemptive scope of federal employment and housing laws. 313 Congress
could also amend federal laws to provide localities with the necessary
authority to address local employment and housing issues. As more and
more immigration control devolves to the states, this is not as unlikely as it
may once have seemed. 314 As well, federal immigration enforcement raids
may have the same general effect as laws like Hazleton's-to flush out
undocumented employees. Finally, insofar as the Hazleton decision rests
on individual due process rights, the procedural infrrmities identified by
the court can easily be remedied. 315
Ultimately, nothing in the Hazleton court's decision suggests that
undocumented aliens have any right to be free from discriminatory

309. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 536, 538.
310. !d. at 536.
311. Id. at 498-99, 514, 534.
312. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 215-16 (1982) (noting fact that illegal aliens could claim the
benefit of the Equal Protection Clause did not establish whether clause had in fact been violated).
313. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (upholding state law regulating employment of
illegal aliens).
314. See Huntington, supra note 20 (discussing federalism aspects of immigration law); see also
Anil Kalhan, Immigration Eriforcement and Federalism After September 11, 2001, in IMMIGRATION,
INTEGRATION, AND SECURITY: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Ariane
d'Appollonia & Simon Reich eds., 2008).
315. This assumes that other courts will agree that illegal aliens have protected property interests
in employment and rental properties. Although none of the cases relied upon by the district court
involved rights of undocumented aliens, the court held that even illegal aliens have protected interests
in their employment and rental agreements. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 533-34, 537-38.
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enforcement measures, to avoid the stigma of disparately harmful laws, or
otherwise to remain in a territory in which they are simply not wanted.
Indeed, rejecting an equal protection challenge to the Hazleton ordinances,
the district court held that the measures were "rationally related to the aim
of limiting the social and public safety problems caused by the presence of
people without legal authorization in the City."316 Under the deferential
rational basis standard, the city was not required to actually demonstrate
any such effects-merely to allege them. Although immigrants won an
important victory in the Hazleton case, courts in other jurisdictions have
subsequently upheld similar measures aimed at punishing employers and
property owners who extend offers of employment or residence to
undocumented persons. 317 Aliens thus cannot necessarily rely upon the
Constitution's structural division of authority or individual rights
provisions to combat local displacements.
The Geography of Membership is dynamic and is still taking shape.
Unlike (most) enemy aliens, undocumented immigrants already reside
within the physical territory of the United States. Unable to prevent their
migration entirely, federal and local officials will likely continue to
manipulate and regulate the territorial borders to effectuate exclusions and
expulsions. 318 Absent comprehensive reform, it is likely that a patchwork
Geography of Membership will continue to develop across the country.
Federal and local efforts to roust undocumented aliens from places of
employment, residences, and public spaces will continue in many
jurisdictions, with the Constitution barring only the most aggressive and
harassing federal and local initiatives. Ultimately, many immigrants-both
documented and undocumented-will either be displaced to sanctuary
localities with less restrictive laws, or be forced to leave the country (in
many cases after lengthy prison terms).
3. The Geography ofPunishment

As reviled as suspected terrorists and undocumented aliens may be,
today the group subject to the greatest public opprobrium-and perhaps
the most substantial territorial and constitutional displacement-is

316. Id. at 542. Plaintiffs contended that the crime rate had actually fallen since immigrants began
arriving in Hazleton. Id. at 542 n.69.
317. Julia Preston, In Reversal, Courts Uphold Local Immigration Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10,
2008, at A22.
318. See generally Shachar, supra note 16 (noting the dynamism and recent reshaping of U.S.
territorial borders).
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released sex offenders. 319 Numerous states, cities, towns, and other local
communities have recently imposed strict territorial controls on such
persons in the name of public safety and health. These laws, which
resemble early state exclusionary measures targeting convicted criminals,
generally establish sex offender-free zones within states and localities. 320
Combined with certain less systematic displacements, discussed below,
these laws are creating a new Geography ofPunishment. 321
More than twenty states and hundreds of localities have recently
adopted laws that prohibit convicted sex offenders from living, working,
or even being present within a specified distance of various "anchor
points"-schools, school bus stops, churches, playgrounds, day care
centers, camps, parks, libraries, public swimming pools, gymnasiums,
video arcades, theaters, convenience stores, and other places. 322 The laws
impose spatial restrictions of various sizes and dimensions. Sex offenderfree zones typically extend from 500 feet to 3000 feet beyond the
designated public facilities, with many states opting for a 1000-foot buffer
zone. 323 A few states and localities have adopted a tiered approach under
which high-risk offenders cannot live within 3000 feet of most anchor
points, moderate-risk individuals cannot live with 2500 feet of such
places, and low-risk offenders are subject to a 1000-foot exclusion zone. 324
In most states and localities, violation ofthe applicable zoning restrictions
constitutes a felony. 325
The sex offender exclusion zones can produce severe physical and
territorial displacements. 326 Under the terms of some zoning measures, an

319. See ADAM SAMPSON, ACTS OF ABUSE: SEX OFFENDERS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
124 (1994) (noting public hatred of sex offenders).
320. See Logan, supra note 23, at 5-13 (describing residency exclusion laws). The sex offender
exclusion laws are just one aspect of an extensive regulatory system for sex offenders. See generally
ERIC S. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT: AMERICA'S SEXUAL PREDATOR LAWS AND THE RISE OF THE
PREVENTIVE STATE (2006) (describing post-release sex offender restrictions).
321. Such laws are tolerated, in part, because they are not considered penal under constitutional
standards. They are not, for example, considered by courts to be unconstitutional ex post facto
punishments. Even if that is technically so, there is still a significant sense in which these laws punish
convicted sex offenders by effectively displacing them from their homes and communities.
322. Logan, supra note 23, at 7.
323. Id.
324. !d.
325. Many of these laws and ordinances exclude sex offenders regardless of the specific
circumstances of their crimes. Id. at 8.
326. Scholars have observed a similar phenomenon with regard to other convicted offenders.
Beckett and Herbert have studied the use of off-limits laws and orders, including Stay Out of Drug
Area (SODA) orders. Their data indicate that persons convicted of drug and prostitution offenses can
be banned from large portions of cities under these orders. Beckett & Herbert, supra note 32, at 13-14.
The use of geographic exclusions has increased markedly in some cities. See id. at 15 (noting increase
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offender is excluded or banished from entire cities-and in certain
instances sizeable portions of entire states. 327 In many instances, there is
no individualized process for challenging one's status and consequent
displacement. 328 Sex offender residency exclusion zones make it difficult
or impossible for released offenders to remain in the community of their
choice.
In practical effect, sex offender exclusion laws may force offenders to
live in remote areas with sparse populations, to cluster in certain
neighborhoods, or simply to leave the state altogether. The most restrictive
of these laws impose a form of modem-day banishment or "internal exile"
through territoriality. 329 The effects of such displacements have been quite
severe for some released offenders. For example, a Miami-Dade County,
Florida, exclusion law at one point forced five convicted sex offenders to
live (with the county's express permission) under a highway bridge. 330
Although they are the most comprehensive, territorial exclusion zones
are not the only measures that have been implemented to control the
presence, mobility, and behavior of sex offenders. For example, one town
proposed housing sex offenders on a boat docked in a local marina. 331
Suffolk County, New York, officials at one point announced plans to put
sex offenders in trailers that would then be moved about the county. 332 The
trailers were to be parked for several weeks at a time on public lands,
some distance from residential areas. Not surprisingly, many local
politicians were concerned about having these mobile sex offender trailers
parked in their districts. 333
In addition, some courts have imposed territorial exclusions in
individual criminal cases-either as punishment or as a condition of
parole. 334 Offenders have been ordered to stay out of a particular territory
for as many as a dozen years. 335 Local governmental officials have
imposed other unique territorial exclusions. For example, local parks

in Seattle drug cases of geographic conditions in probation cases-from 7.1% in 2001 to 30.1% in
2005).
327. See Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700,706--07 (8th Cir. 2005) (describing effects oflowa law).
328. Logan, supra note 23, at 14 (discussing lack of individual determination of dangerousness
under Iowa exclusion law).
329. Yung, supra note 22, at Ill (describing effect of sex offender exclusions as "internal exile").
330. Sex Offenders Living Under Miami Bridge, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2007, at A22.
331. Kilgannon, supra note 26.
332. !d.
333. !d.
334. See Vesna Jaksic, A New Type of Sentence for Criminal Offenders: Exile, NAT'L L.J., Dec.
10, 2007, available at http://www.nlj.com (noting recent increase in "banishment" or "exile"
sentences).
335. !d.
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officials in Lafayette, Indiana, banished a convicted sex offender for life
from all city park properties, including community schools, city parks,
golf courses, swimming pools, and sports stadiums. 336
The use of territory to control released sex offenders is part of a
broader trend involving the spatialization of crime control. 337 Prostitutionfree zones, gang-free zones, and drug dealer-free zones are also part of the
developing Geography of Punishment. 338 As noted earlier, many
contemporary territorial measures are deeply rooted in early state laws
excluding and displacing vagabonds, paupers, and other unwanted persons
in an effort to purify urban spaces. 339
Although sex offender exclusion measures implicate a seemingly
impressive array of constitutional provisions, to date they have proven
mostly impervious to constitutional challenge. 340 Doe v. Miller341 is the
lead case involving the constitutionality of sex offender exclusion
zones. 342 Doe upheld an Iowa statute that prohibited convicted sex
offenders from residing within two thousand feet of any school or childcare facility. 343 According to the lower court's fmdings, the Iowa law
severely limited the places where convicted offenders could legally
reside. 344 Released offenders were excluded from Des Moines and Iowa
City, the two largest cities in the state. 345 They were also excluded from
many smaller towns and cities. 346 Indeed, according to the district court,

336. See Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2004) (upholding order).
337. Logan, supra note 23, at 11; see also Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control,
Ill YALE L.J. 1039 (2002) (examining various methods by which territory and architecture control
crime).
338. Terence R. Boga, Note, Turf Wars: Street Gangs, Local Governments, and the Battle for
Public Space, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 477 (1994); Peter M. Flanagan, Note, Trespass-Zoning:
Ensuring Neighborhoods a Safer Future by Excluding Those with a Criminal Past, 79 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 327 (2003); Sandra L. Moser, Comment, Anti-Prostitution Zones: Justifications for Abolition, 91
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1101 (2001); Robert L. Scharff, Note, An Analysis of Municipal Drug
and Prostitution Exclusion Zones, 15 GEO. MASON U. Crv. Rrs. L.J. 321 (2005).
339. For an analysis of new forms of social control in urban places, including territorial exclusions
of persons convicted of drug or prostitution offenses, see Beckett & Herbert, supra note 32, at 13-15.
340. Several state appellate courts have upheld sex offender exclusion laws. See Boyd v. State,
960 So. 2d 722 (Ala. 2006); ACLU of New Mexico v. City of Albuquerque, 2006-NMCA-078, 139
N.M. 761, 137 P.3d 1215 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006); Nasal v. Dover, 169 Ohio App. 3d 262, 2005-0hio5584, 862 N.E.2d 571 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006).
341. 405 F .3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005).
342. The Eighth Circuit applied the same analysis to Arkansas's sex offender exclusion law in
Weems v. Little Rock Police Dept., 453 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 2006).
343. Miller, 405 F.3d at 704-05.
344. See id. at 706--07 (discussing lower court findings with regard to the law's displacing
effects).
345. Doe v. Miller, 298 F. Supp. 2d 844, 851 (S.D. Iowa 2004), rev'd, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir.
2005).
346. !d.
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offenders were essentially relegated to isolated rural or industrial areas
within the state. 347 Even in zones within the state that were not affected by
the exclusion law, moreover, released offenders were not guaranteed
available and affordable housing? 48
Plaintiffs pursued a host of constitutional claims, all of which were
rejected. The Eighth Circuit held that the exclusion law was not
unconstitutionally vague, even though it was difficult to identify the
location of schools and child care facilities in many of the state's
communities. 349 Nor, according to the court, were plaintiffs entitled to any
sort of individualized determination of dangerousness prior to the
residency exclusion going into effect. 350 Under the Due Process Clause,
the Iowa legislature was required to draw only a rational classification; the
court was satisfied it had done so. 351
Adopting a narrow view of the Supreme Court's precedents involving
rights to associate with family members, 352 the court held that the Iowa
law did not "directly regulate the family relationship or prevent any family
member from residing with a sex offender in a residence that is consistent
with the statute."353 If the offender was forced to move to a rural area, the
court reasoned that the family unit could be preserved intact by having
other family members move as well. 354
The court also rejected plaintiffs' arguments that the residency
exclusion law violated rights to interstate travel or intrastate movement. 355
Sex offenders from outside the state, the court reasoned, were still free to
move into Iowa so long as they abided by the residency exclusion. 356 With
regard to barriers to intrastate movement, the Eighth Circuit correctly
noted that the Supreme Court has not expressly recognized any
fundamental right to travel within a state. 357 Although the court
acknowledged that some circuits had indeed recognized such a right, it did
not reach the question. 358 It was sufficient, said the court, that the Iowa

347. Id.
348. See Miller, 405 F.3d at 724 (Melloy, J., concurring and dissenting) (noting that unrestricted
areas in Des Moines included "some of the city's newest and most expensive neighborhoods").
349. Id. at 708 (majority opinion).
350. !d. at 709.
351. !d.
352. See id. at 709-10 (discussing fundamental privacy rights).
353. !d. at 711.
354. !d.
355. /d.at711-13.
356. !d. at 712.
357. !d.
358. See id. at 712-13 (discussing sister circuit rulings on right to intrastate travel).
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residency exclusion imposed no direct barrier to intrastate movementeven within the exclusion zones. 359
Noting the Supreme Court's reluctance to interpret substantive due
process expansively, the court summarily dismissed the argument that
plaintiffs possessed a fundamental right to "live where [they] want." 360
The court also held that the Iowa residency exclusions did not impose a
retroactive punishment for offenses committed prior to the law's
enactment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 361 It specifically
rejected the contention that the residency exclusion law was a form of
"banishment" or punitive expulsion from the community. 362 The court
reasoned that the Iowa residency exclusion merely affected where an
offender could reside within the zones; it did not banish or expel him from
any excluded area.
Less systematic, but no less burdensome, displacements on sex
offenders have also been upheld. In Doe v. City of Lafayette,363 for
example, the Seventh Circuit, sitting en bane, upheld an administrative
parks department order that excluded a convicted sex offender
permanently from all city park properties. 364 The territory covered by the
ban was substantial; it included a golf course, a zoo, a sports stadium, city
pools, and several public parks. 365 Doe was convicted of violating the
order when he appeared at a public park and entertained "thoughts" about
sexual contact with a group of older children there. 366
Doe brought several constitutional challenges to the order, all of which
the Seventh Circuit rejected. Regarding his First Amendment claims, the
court noted that Doe had not engaged in any expressive activity and was
not using the parks for expressive purposes. 367 Even if Doe had engaged in
some form of expression, the court alternatively held, such expression
constituted "incitement" and/or "obscenity," and was thus not protected by
the First Amendment. 368 The court also rejected Doe's argument that the

359. Id. at 713.
360. !d. at 713-14.
361. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; Miller, 405 F.3d at 723. The court also rejected plaintiffs'
argument that the law violated their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. See id. at 716.
362. !d. at 719-20. On the analogy between residency exclusion laws and banishment, see
generally Yung, supra note 22.
363. 377 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2004).
364. !d. at 774.
365. !d. at 760 & n.l. The order was entered without any notice whatever to Doe, and without any
opportunity for him to contest it. Doe did not challenge the order on procedural due process grounds.
366. !d. at 760 (noting that Doe testified that although he was having sexual urges toward children
the night he went to the park, "[t]hey were just thoughts").
367. Id. at 763--64.
368. !d. at 764 n.7. These holdings are simply unsupportable on the facts. Doe had not displayed
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order violated the First Amendment by excluding him from public places
based solely on his private thoughts or beliefs 369 (although in doing so it
made repeated references to Doe's status as a convicted sex offender and
his apparent intention to interact with children at the park). 370
The Seventh Circuit also rejected Doe's claim that the exclusion order
violated his right to intrastate movement or travel. The court concluded
that Doe was minimally burdened in terms of movement, as he was free to
roam the community so long as he avoided all of the proscribed areas. 371
Finally, the court refused to recognize any fundamental right to enter the
park properties simply to loiter or for other innocent purposes. 372 The right
to be present in a public park was not, said the court, "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty."373 Finally, the court stated that the right to be
present in public places was not fundamental to Doe's "personhood."374
Released sex offenders have had some limited success challenging
exclusion laws. For example, the Georgia Supreme Court recently
invalidated that state's sex offender residency exclusion law, which
required that a registered sex offender move from his home or business
any time a school, child care facility, or other anchor place was located
within 1000 feet of the home or business. 375 Under the law, offenders were
forced to move from their homes even if a protected facility such as a
daycare moved within a specified distance of the home long after the
offender had taken up residence there. 376 The court held that this form of
territorial banishment amounted to an uncompensated regulatory taking in
violation of the Fifth Amendment. 377 It reasoned that the residency-

any obscene or child pornography materials and was not engaged in any obscene conduct. See Osborne
v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990). Nor did he incite imminent lawless action of any kind. In fact, he did not
even speak to anyone. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (requiring advocacy of lawless
action and likelihood it will occur).
369. City ofLafayette, 377 F.3d at 765-67.
370. Id.at758, 762,763-64.
371. !d. at 770-71.
372. Id. Although no such right was claimed, the court first rejected any right "to enter parks to
prey on children." !d. at 770 n.ll.
373. !d. at 770 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)). The Court rejected
Doe's claim that he had a fundamental right to be in public for the purpose of loitering or loafing. But
see City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 53 (1999) (plurality opinion) (noting that freedom to
loiter is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
374. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 771. The court oddly reasoned that Doe's claimed right to be
present in the public parks could hardly be "fundamental," given that he had last exercised it a decade
or so prior to the order. !d. The court did not cite any authority for the proposition that one waives a
liberty interest by failing to frequently exercise it. Id.
375. Mann v. Georgia Dep't ofCorr., 653 S.E.2d 740,741 (Ga. 2007).
376. !d. at 742.
377. Id. at 745.
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exclusion law acted as a physical ouster of plaintiff from his residence,
extinguishing any investment-backed expectations. 378 Of course, a ruling
based on the Takings Clause does not prevent the state from enforcing its
exclusion law and ousting the property owner in pursuit of some public
purpose; the Takings Clause is a liability rule that merely requires the
government pay fair market value for the property.
Other territorial displacements of released sex offenders have not yet
been challenged in the courts. It is not clear, for example, whether a
county or municipality may confine sex offenders to houseboats or
traveling mobile homes. 379 Nor do we know whether the Miami-Dade
County law, which effectively forced offenders to live under a bridge,
meets constitutional requirements. 380 With the exception of the somewhat
anomalous and unique takings decision by the Georgia Supreme Court,
however, precedent strongly suggests that extensive territorial
displacements can be imposed upon sex offenders consistent with present
interpretations of constitutional liberty. Internal exile is thus a very
attractive option for policy makers faced with a population of released sex
offenders.
Sex offenders remain vulnerable to serious territorial and constitutional
displacements. In addition to public laws enforcing territorial exclusions,
some courts have also upheld private property arrangements like
restrictive covenants, which similarly operate to exclude convicted
offenders from entire communities. 381 People convicted of a range of sex
offenses may find it difficult indeed to choose their own place.
4. The Geography ofPurification
Like the local immigration and sex offender-exclusion laws,
contemporary efforts to purify public places by displacing or removing
convicted drug offenders, the homeless, and other marginalized persons
are also deeply rooted in our nation's history. 382 During the past two
decades or so, a distinct Geography of Purification has developed in urban
areas across America. 383 This legal geography is grounded in urban

378. Id. at 744.
379. See Kilgannon, supra note 26.
380. See Sex Offenders Living Under Miami Bridge, supra note 24.
381. See Mulligan v. Panther Valley Prop. Owners Ass'n, 766 A.2d 1186, 1192 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2001) (upholding restrictive covenant barring sale to convicted sex offender).
382. See generally Simon, supra note 190 (discussing history ofhomelessness measures).
383. See Beckett & Herbert, supra note 32, at 5 ("[I]t is clear that municipal governments across
the United States are implementing new legal tools aimed at cleaning up contested urban spaces.").
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management principles and sociological theories which generally hold that
controlling social disorder requires first controlling public places and
territories. 384
Territoriality lies at the heart of many recent urban purification
efforts. 385 Some urban officials have relied upon concentration of the
homeless in particular geographic areas like "Skid Rows. " 386 These are
merely quasi-territorial measures, however, since the homeless are not
technically required to stay there. The principal territorial strategies,
commonly pursued since the early 1990s, have been spatial dispersal and
exclusion of the homeless and other unwanted populations from public
places. 387 In particular, public officials have imposed various limitations
on where the destitute, homeless, and other marginalized persons can
legally be, and what they can do in places they are permitted to occupy. 388
As homelessness, in particular, has persisted in many cities, officials
have resorted to measures that ban and criminalize activities like sleeping,
loitering, erecting structures, and asking for alms in public places. 389 These
measures became particularly prevalent in the early 1990s, as cities began
to address what many then felt was intolerable disorder in public places. 390
Public officials like then-mayor Rudolph Giuliani of New York City
implemented policies based on the "broken windows" theory of public
order. 391 The approach, advanced in a 1982 article in The Atlantic Monthly
by James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, was based on the premise that
disorder and crime were inextricably linked. 392 If a window in a building is
not repaired, the basic theory holds, soon all of the windows in that
building will be broken. And there goes the neighborhood.
By analogy and extension, homeless persons, vagrants, and other
marginalized individuals have been treated as broken windows.
Controlling their location has become a critical strategy for preserving the
safety and aesthetics of local neighborhood territories. As a result, begging

384. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Ordering (and Order in) the City, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1 (2004)
(discussing approaches to imposing order in urban spaces).
385. See generally Ellickson, supra note 30 (examining use of public places by the homelessness).
386. Id. at 1202; see id. at 1202-09 (describing origination and use of Skid Rows in urban areas).
387. Beckett & Herbert, supra note 32, at 8-10.
388. !d. at 10--16 (describing recent innovations in urban social control, including use of trespass
laws and "off limits" orders).
389. !d. at 8-9 (describing use of"broken windows" policing and civility laws).
390. See Ellickson, supra note 30, at 1167 (noting increased disorderliness by early 1990s).
391. See Mike Allen, Crackdown Turns the Village Quiet but Wary, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1998, at
A1 (discussing then-Mayor Giuliani's focus on quality-of-life crimes and its repercussions).
392. James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood
Safety, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982,29-31. See generally KELLING& COLES, supra note 31.
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and other public acts by the homeless are treated as symptoms of public
disorder and public nuisance. 393 To make communities and local territories
safer and more palatable to the general public, beggars and other
purportedly disruptive persons have often been systematically removed
from certain locations. 394 In some cities, ordinances prohibiting
trespassing, loitering in certain public places, interference with pedestrian
traffic, vagrancy, and disorderly conduct have been enforced in such a
manner that the homeless are simply removed from certain territories
altogether. 395 In addition, territorial sweeps, innovative and aggressive use
of trespass laws, enforcement of broad exclusion laws in public parks, and
even changes to physical places and architectures have effectively created
homeless-free zones in many cities. 396
One of the most common measures relied upon to regulate the
homeless has been the adoption and enforcement of begging-free zones.
Many local laws and ordinances ban appeals for assistance in various
public areas including beaches, sidewalks near banks and sports stadiums,
public places near tourist attractions, and areas near sidewalk cafes. 397
Some states and localities have enacted blanket bans prohibiting begging
in all public places. 398 Some states adhere to a common law rule that
prohibits begging in any public place by any person who is "able to
work." 399 Still other state and local laws prohibit "loitering for the purpose
of begging" in any public place. 400 Other measures prohibit "aggressive"

393. See Beckett & Herbert, supra note 32, at 9 (noting prevalence of laws restricting "sitting or
lying on sidewalks or in bus shelters, sleeping in parks and other public spaces, placing one's personal
possessions on public property for more than a short period of time, camping, urinating or drinking in
public, selling newspapers and other written materials in public spaces, and begging.").
394. See generally DON MITCHELL, THE RIGHT TO THE CITY: SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE FIGHT FOR
PuBLIC SPACE (2003).
395. See Beckett & Herbert, supra note 32, at 10--16 (describing effects of exclusionary laws).
396. See id. at 10-13 (discussing trespass and parks exclusion laws); see also MIKE DAVIS, CITY
OF QUARTZ: EXCAVATING THE FUTURE IN LOS ANGELES 235 (1990) (describing the "bum-proof'
bench and other socio-spatial strategies used by Los Angeles officials). For a sociological account of
how these limits are experienced, see MITCHELL DUNEIER, SIDEWALK (1999).
397. See Tracy A. Bateman, Annotation, Laws Regulating Begging, Panhandling, or Similar
Activity by Poor or Homeless Persons, 7 A.L.R. 5TH 455 (2006); see also NAT'L LAW CENTER ON
HOMELESSNESS AND POVERTY, PUNISHING POVERTY: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS,
LITIGATION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SOLUTIONS (May 2003), http://www.nlchp.org/content/
pubs/Punishing%20Poverty.pdf [hereinafter PuNISHING POVERTY]. The First Amendment implications
of anti-begging laws are discussed in Helen Hershkoff & AdamS. Cohen, Commentary, Begging to
Differ: The First Amendment and the Right to Beg, 104 HARV. L. REv. 896 (1991).
398. Laws and ordinances relating to homelessness are described in Bateman, supra note 397, § 2.
399. !d.
400. !d.
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panhandling, which generally consists of following, harassing, or
accosting others while making an appeal for assistance. 401
In some cities with increasing homeless populations, even these
territorial measures have not been deemed adequately purifying.
Responding to decades of frustration with an intractable homeless
problem, Los Angeles officials enacted an ordinance described by a
federal judge as "one of the most restrictive municipal laws regulating
public spaces in the United States. " 402 Section 41.18(d) of the Los Angeles
Municipal Code provided: ''No person shall sit, lie or sleep in or upon any
street, sidewalk or other public way."403 Violations of the ordinance were
punishable by a fine of up to $1000 and/or imprisonment of up to six
months. 404 Public order laws typically limit infractions to situations in
which the person actually obstructs a public way or engages in proscribed
conduct during certain hours of the day. 405 The Los Angeles ordinance was
different, in part because it contained no such restrictions. 406 Given its
breadth, the ordinance effectively criminalized the public presence of
thousands of homeless persons within the territory of Los Angeles.
Localities continue to experiment with new ways to purify public
places. Some have even criminalized feeding the homeless in certain
public places, including parks. According to one advocate for the
homeless, a Las Vegas ordinance makes it illegal ''to offer so much as a
biscuit to a poor person in a city park."407 Other localities have enacted
laws which limit the time, place, and manner of distributing meals to the
homeless. 408 Officials have indicated that they are concerned that
congregating homeless populations will undermine expensive efforts to
beautify public spaces. 409 They also maintain that the intent of the laws is
to encourage the homeless to visit social service organizations, rather than
receive assistance in public areas. 410 The effect in some localities,
however, is to displace the homeless from places in which they regularly
gather and receive basic assistance.

401. !d.§ 3(b).
402. Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot, 505
F .3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007).
403. L.A., CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. IV, art. 1, § 41.18(d) (2005).
404. !d.
405. See Jones, 444 F.3d at 1123 (describing laws in other jurisdictions).
406. !d.
407. Archibold, supra note 34.
408. !d.
409. !d.
410. !d.
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What constitutional protection exists against these various forms of
territorial purification? In light of the First Amendment, one might at least
assume that the right of the homeless and other destitute persons to be in
public places for the purpose of communicating with the public must be
protected. Even this liberty, however, is far from certain. The primary
message the homeless appear to be communicating is one of destitution
and helplessness. 411 Whether begging actually constitutes a form of
protected expression has not been definitively answered. Some argue that
panhandling is more akin to conduct constituting a public nuisance than
expression. 412 Others claim that begging is expression that lies at the core
of several First Amendment concerns and values. 413 Although the Supreme
Court has recognized that organized charities enjoy expressive liberties, it
has not yet opined on individual begging. 414 Lower courts have disagreed
regarding whether begging is entitled to First Amendment protection. 415
Even if panhandling or begging cannot be flatly banned, most beggarfree zones are likely to satisfy the First Amendment. Targeted beach areas,
spaces near sidewalk cafes and banks, public spaces near monuments, and
other public places can often be purified consistent with current First
Amendment standards. Under the time, place, and manner standard,
localities can readily justify these measures as being related to public order
and safety. So long as they constitute reasonably tailored regulations,
courts are likely to uphold limited begging-free zones. 416
What of stricter purification enactments that ban sustenance activities
like sleeping or resting in public places? Of course, no one has an absolute
constitutional right to be in any particular public place or territory for any
purpose. The Constitution does, however, impose minimal limits on the
power of government to displace persons from public areas based solely
upon their status. The Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause has been interpreted to substantively limit what

411. See Hershkoff & Cohen, supra note 397, at 913 (discussing message of panhandling).
412. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 30, at 1179-84 (discussing "chronic" panhandling).
413. See Hershkoff & Cohen, supra note 397, at 913-15.
414. See Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind ofNorth Carolina, Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988); Sec'y of
State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984); Viii. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for
a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
415. See Hershkoff & Cohen, supra note 397, at 897 n.6 (discussing cases). The Second Circuit
has actually taken both sides of this issue. Compare Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d
146, 156 (2d Cir. 1990) (describing begging as more conduct than speech and "a menace to the
common good"), with Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1993)
(treating begging as protected expression).
416. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 794 (1989) (noting that under the time,
place, and manner doctrine, "perfect clarity and precise guidance have never been required even of
regulations that restrict expressive activity.").
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governments may criminalize. 417 Specifically, the clause prohibits
criminalization of conditions like disease, mental illness, or addiction. 418
Such "status" punishments are considered "cruel and unusual" under the
Eighth Amendment because they penalize involuntary conditions rather
than voluntary conduct. Voluntary actions, by contrast, can be
criminalized. Thus, although alcoholism itself cannot be criminalized, the
act of appearing in certain public places intoxicated can be punished. 419 In
sum, a person can be displaced-jailed, fined, or excluded-based upon
what she does but not solely for who she is.
Homelessness is somewhat problematic under this constitutional rubric.
For one thing, there is disagreement regarding whether "the homeless" is
even an accurate descriptor of any discrete population. 420 Moreover, some
are not convinced that homelessness is in fact a wholly involuntary
status. 421 Regardless, insofar as efforts to purifY public places are
concerned, governments may certainly regulate certain public acts
engaged in by the homeless or those living on the streets. With regard to
some such conduct-bathing, urinating, sleeping, and storing
possessions-the truly homeless of course have no alternative place. 422 An
outright ban on any of these things is thus tantamount to a ban on public
presence. In other words, there is a point at which the distinction between
status and conduct seems ultimately to disappear.
Notwithstanding the stark reality of laws criminalizing public presence
and sustenance activities, some localities have successfully defended
rather broad territorial displacements against Eighth Amendment
challenges. 423 According to the Ninth Circuit, however, Los Angeles
simply went too far with its ordinance, described above, prohibiting
homeless persons from simply being in certain public places. 424 The court

417. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
418. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding that status of drug addict
could not be basis for criminal conviction).
419. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 533 (1968) (plurality opinion) (upholding conviction for
public drunkenness).
420. See Ellickson, supra note 30, at 1191-94 (distinguishing between the truly "homeless" and
"street people").
421. See id. at 1187 (disagreeing that the destitute generally lack choices with regard to where to
eat and sleep, and stating that begging "is an option, not an inevitability").
422. Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L. REv. 295, 311
(1991).
423. See, e.g., Joyce v. City & County of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 851-53 (N.D. Cal.
1994) (denying injunction with respect to enforcement of comprehensive homelessness program on
Eighth Amendment grounds). But see Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1554 (S.D. Fla.
1992) (holding that arresting homeless for harmless, involuntary conduct violates Eighth Amendment).
424. See supra notes 402-06 and accompanying text.
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invalidated the ordinance on the ground that it punished the "status" of
being homeless in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 425
A careful reading of the Ninth Circuit's opinion, however, shows that
the homeless have no protected "right to the city."426 First, the Ninth
Circuit emphasized the plaintiffs' "substantial showing" that they simply
had no choice but to be on the streets owing to a lack of shelter beds. 427
Presumably, had shelter been available at the time of enforcement, and had
plaintiffs failed to avail themselves of it, their displacement from public
areas would have been constitutional. Thus, under the court's
interpretation, a person's choice to remain on the streets rather than go to a
shelter receives no constitutional protection.
Second, what little protection the Ninth Circuit granted homeless
persons to choose their own place may well lack solid support under
controlling Eighth Amendment precedents. The Supreme Court has never
held that conduct derivative of a person's status cannot be criminalized. 428
As noted above, a person may be rendered homeless owing to a host of
circumstances that have nothing to do with an involuntary condition.
Additionally, part of what creates the condition in the first place is
government's failure to provide the necessary shelter. The Constitution,
however, does not generally provide any remedy for the government's
failure to provide a benefit. Finally, homelessness is different from other
conditions in that it may affiict a person intermittently. Those who are not
permanently homeless may not qualify for protection under the Supreme
Court's status/conduct distinction. In sum, the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause does not provide any clear or robust protection for a
right to be present in a public place.
The most recent purification measures-those banning the feeding of
indigent and homeless persons in public places-have not yet been fully
tested in the courts. Classifications based upon indigence are subject to
mere rationality review. 429 As noted earlier, local officials argue that
public order and health are best maintained when the homeless are served
at facilities that offer more structured assistance-a purpose that generally
would meet the deferential rationality standard. Some of the feeding laws

425. Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1132 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot, 505
F .3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007).
426. MITCHELL, supra note 394.
427. Jones, 444 F.3d at 1136.
428. See, e.g., Joyce, 846 F. Supp. at 855-57 (rejecting view that precedents protect acts
"derivative" of homeless statns).
429. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478 (1977) (upholding denial of Medicaid funds for two
indigent women's elective, non-therapeutic abortions under rational basis).
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do not define "indigence" with sufficient specificity, which may leave the
measures vulnerable to vagueness and other procedural challenges. The
feeding bans also raise associational, assembly, and speech concerns.
Assuming, however, that the definitional and coverage issues can be
resolved, limits on the number of persons who may be fed, the specific
location of the charitable activity, or the time of day in which it may take
place may well be upheld against First Amendment and other
constitutional challenges.
The public presence and activities of homeless, destitute, and other
marginalized persons are inconsistent with a vision of the purified public
square. These individuals presently occupy precarious constitutional
ground. The Constitution permits their substantial territorial displacement,
subject to certain outer boundaries: a First Amendment concept of
"expression" that may or may not include begging for assistance in public;
an amorphous status/conduct distinction under the Eighth Amendment's
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause; and a less than robust liberty to
receive charity in the public places of their choosing.
5. The Geography of Contagion
As noted in Part II, outbreaks of disease have historically given rise to
territorial restrictions. Although there have been extraordinary medical
advances in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, there may be
occasions in the near future in which territorial restrictions will be
imposed upon persons infected (or believed to be infected) with
communicable diseases.
A bioterrorist attack or an outbreak of sudden acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS), avian flu, anthrax, smallpox, or multi-resistant strains
of communicable diseases may require that governments consider
imposing substantial restrictions on movement, public presence, and
public activities. The two principal public health strategies used to combat
contagion-isolation and quarantine-are explicitly territorial in nature. 430
Isolation is used for the demonstrably sick or infected. The person is
placed under observation in a specific place and cannot leave until the
isolation order is lifted. 431 Quarantine is the compulsory sequestration of

430. See generally Mark A. Rothstein, Are Traditional Public Health Strategies Consistent with
Contemporary American Values?, 77 TEMP. L. REv. 175 (2004) (explaining quarantine, isolation, and
other public health measures).
431. LAWRENCEO. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 210 (2000).
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groups of possibly exposed persons or confmement of such persons within
certain geographic areas. 432
Isolation has been used on occasion to segregate infected individuals
from the general public. For instance, a twenty-seven-year-old Phoenix
resident was recently confmed to a county jail cell for more than a year to
protect the public from a resistant strain of tuberculosis. 433 In a more
prominently reported instance, a patient who traveled to Europe for his
wedding (apparently against the advice of federal health officials) was
subject to a federal isolation order upon his return. 434
There has not been a large-scale quarantine in the United States since
the early twentieth century. Nevertheless, quarantine remains a likely
response in the event of a modern public health emergency. Indeed, during
some recent bioterrorism exercises, large-scale geographic quarantines
were imposed by participating officials. 435 The potential use of isolation
and quarantine to protect public health and safety raises the prospect that a
Geography of Contagion may develop.
Territorial isolation and quarantine are sometimes necessary public
health measures. Current federal and state laws provide officials with
ample authority to isolate and quarantine individuals believed to be
infected with, or to have been in contact with those infected with, a variety
of communicable diseases. 436 Under current federal laws and regulations,
health officials have the authority to detain and examine any individual
believed to be infected with a communicable disease and traveling to or
from a foreign land or from one state to another. 437 Federal health officials
also have the authority to aid or enforce local quarantines in the event of a
public health emergency. 438 Violation of a federal quarantine order is a
criminal misdemeanor, and courts are empowered to order injunctive relief
to prevent such violations. 439

432. !d. at 209-10.
433. Chris Kahn, TB Victim is Locked Up in Arizona, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 2, 2007, available
at http://cbc.ca/healthlstory/2007/04/03/tuberculosis-prison.html (noting that Texas had placed
seventeen people in isolation).
434. Lawrence K. Altman & John Schwartz, Near Misses Allowed Man with Tuberculosis to Fly
to andfrom Europe, Health Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2007, at A13.
435. John D. Blum, Too Strange to be Just Fiction: Legal Lessons from a Bioterrorist Simulation,
the Case ojTOPOFF 2, 64 LA. L. REv. 905 (2004).
436. See generally ANGIE A. WELBORN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL AND STATE
ISOLATION AND QUARANTINE AUTHORITY, REPORT FOR CONGRESS NO. 31333 (2005) (describing
state and federal quarantine and isolation laws).
437. See 42 U.S.C. § 264 (2000) (granting federal Centers for Disease Control authority to isolate,
quarantine, and examine persons).
438. WELBORN, supra note 436.
439. !d.
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Recently proposed federal homeland security plans and health agency
regulations-the first proposed changes in federal quarantine authority in
twenty-five years-would extend the government's isolation and
quarantine authority in the face of a public health threat. 440 The Centers for
Disease Control has proposed revisions to the federal quarantine
regulations that would allow the government, under a procedure called
"provisional quarantine," to detain sick airline and other passengers for up
to three business days without any administrative hearing. 441 The
regulations would also permit various forms of surveillance with regard to
those considered at risk of infection, and would authorize the federal
government to seize private property under certain circumstances. 442
Although they must generally yield to any conflicting federal laws and
directives, state officials may also impose isolation and quarantine. State
laws currently provide varying degrees of regulatory and judicial process
for isolated and quarantined persons. 443 Most of the laws have not received
legislative attention in years; many are between forty and 100 years old.
Some states are, however, beginning to reassess their quarantine and other
public health laws. 444 A Model State Emergency Health Powers Act was
recently drafted by The Centers for Law and the Public's Health at
Georgetown and Johns Hopkins Universities. 445 The Model Act attempts
to specify, among other things, appropriate limits on state use of
quarantine and isolation.
Territorial restrictions implemented as part of public health strategies
may be quite substantial. In light of new and particularly virulent public
health threats, even indefinite detentions are a possibility. 446 As in the past,
restrictions and public health orders may deny persons access to public
places like movie theatres, transit stations, and schools. Borders may be
closed to immigration and migration. Certain public gatherings may be
banned. Households or entire neighborhoods may have to be quarantined

440. See Batlan, supra note 35, at 110-19 (describing proposed federal regulations).
441. See Control of Communicable Diseases, 70 Fed. Reg. 71892 (proposed Nov. 30, 2005) (to be
codified at 42 C.P.R. pts. 70, 71); Batlan, supra note 35, at 114 (describing '"provisional quarantine'"
procedure).
442. Batlan, supra note 35, at 111-14.
443. Lawrence 0. Gostin eta!., The Law and the Public's Health: A Study of Infectious Disease
Law in the United States, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 59 (1999). For a fifty-state survey of state quarantine
provisions, see TRUST FOR AMERICA'S HEALTH, STATE QUARANTINE AND ISOLATION LAWS (2004),
http://healthyamericans.org/reports/bioterror04/Quarantine.pdf.
444. Batlan, supra note 35, at 118.
445. CTRS. FOR LAW & THE PuBLIC'S HEALTH, MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS
ACT (Dec 21, 2001 ), available at http://www. publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPAIMSEHPA. pdf.
446. Batlan, supra note 35, at 117.
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for weeks, perhaps even longer. Officials will likely feel pressured to act
very quickly, and to retain spatial and geographic restrictions for as long
as possible. 447
Like other territorial measures, isolation, detention, and quarantine may
impact spatial liberties such as personal mobility, migration, public
presence, and access to homes and other properties. 448 Constitutional
issues arising from these displacements will include due process
requirements relating to detention, liberties of interstate and intrastate
travel, rights of association and privacy,449 equal protection, and rights to
compensation for any condemned properties. 450
Constitutional limitations on isolation and quarantine have not been
rigorously analyzed by scholars or tested in the courts. Undoubtedly, the
federal and state governments have very broad authority under the
Constitution and health and welfare statutes to respond to public health
threats. Particularly in an emergency situation, state and federal authorities
would have wide latitude to impose isolation, detention, and quarantine on
affected persons and populations. 451
Broad challenges based upon lack of constitutional or statutory
authority would likely be unsuccessful, particularly during a public health
emergency. The general standard with regard to public health emergencies
remains Justice Holmes's early-twentieth-century formulation, which
requires merely that public health laws not be "unreasonable, arbitrary, or
oppressive."452 Of course, much has occurred since this standard was
announced, including the judicial recognition of fundamental
constitutional rights to privacy and liberty as well as remarkable advances
in medicine and science. Broadly speaking, these developments will
provide some gloss on reasonableness. History demonstrates, however,

447. According to a recent study of public health responses to the 1918 influenza pandemic in the
United States, the earlier officials lock down public territories, and the longer they keep restrictions in
place, the lower the death count. See Hatchett, Mecher & Lipsitch, supra note 208, at 7584 (reporting
results of analysis of 1918 influenza pandemic).
448. Batlan, supra note 35, at 112.
449. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984) (noting rights of "intimate
association" like family); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-90 (1960) (invalidating statute
requiring disclosure of organizational memberships). Proposed federal plans and regulations would
likely result in increased surveillance activities relating to such things as passenger screening. Batlan,
supra note 35, at 112.
450. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (requiring "just compensation" for takings).
451. See, e.g., Bernadette Meyler, Economic Emergency and the Rule ofLaw, 56 DEPAUL L. REv.
539 (2007) (examining operation of Takings Clause and other constitutional provisions in
emergencies).
452. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11,26 (1905).
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that protection against territorial and some forms of constitutional
displacement wanes considerably during public health emergencies. 453
In more specific terms, the process due in the event of forcible
detainments and isolations will likely depend upon the process feasiblewhich may be rudimentary in an emergency involving an unknown or
rapidly evolving threat. 454 In an emergency, governments will likely be
permitted to detain and isolate individuals without a hearing for several
days while the threat is assessed. A several-day detention order, with some
avenue provided for administrative appeal, would probably satisfy
constitutional due process requirements. Detention and other forms of
displacement beyond such a limited time frame would obviously raise
more serious concerns. At the least, assuming legal institutions are open
and operating, habeas corpus review must be made available to those
subject to isolation or quarantine orders. 455
Isolation and quarantine orders may impact mobility-sometimes
severely. As noted earlier in the context of sex offender laws, courts are
divided as to whether there is any fundamental right to intrastate mobility
or travel. 456 Even if a court were to recognize such a right, an isolation or
quarantine order would likely survive judicial scrutiny. The interest in
preserving public health would likely be deemed compelling. The
government would also likely be given substantial leeway in tailoring the
territorial restrictions of any quarantine order. With regard to broader
travel rights, the Supreme Court has indicated that the right to foreign
travel can be restricted where it would threaten the public health. 457 Of
course, some safeguards must be in place to ensure that evacuation,
quarantine, and isolation orders can be altered, in terms of time and
geographic area, as circumstances change and information is gathered.
Lengthy isolations and broad quarantines would also interfere with
associational liberties, such as the right to live with family members. In
sum, governments would have to ensure that these displacements were
tailored to the emergency.
As antecedent quarantines of Asian Americans, prostitutes, and AIDS
carriers have shown, officials can be particularly insensitive to equality

453. See Batlan, supra note 35, at 119 (noting substantial deference courts have given to
authorities during past epidemics).
454. See id at 117 (questioning whether procedures contemplated under federal plans and
proposed regulations would be sustainable in the event of an outbreak).
455. See id. at 116 (noting that proposed rules provide for habeas corpus challenges).
456. See supra notes 357-58 and accompanying text.
457. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 15 (1965) (upholding limits on right to travel abroad).
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concerns during public health emergencies. 458 The temptation to use race
or ethnicity as proxies for infection may be quite high. Quarantine for
avian flu victims, for example, may target or disparately impact Asian
Americans. 459 Written standards and other measures should be in place to
protect persons who are infected-or are from places affected by a
bioterrorist attack or pandemic-from discrimination by officials and
health care providers. Given the concern with stigmatic harms arising from
displacement, authorities ought to pay particular attention to the manner in
which spatial segregation and quarantine are imposed. 46 ° Controls and
preventive measures are critical in light of the fact that absent invidious
intent, territorial displacements that disparately affect certain minorities or
classes will likely withstand equal protection and other constitutional
challenges. 461
Finally, some properties, including homes and businesses, may have to
be condemned and destroyed in the event of a pandemic or bioterrorist
attack. Assuming a public health necessity, no compensation would likely
be required under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. 462 In some
cases properties may also have to be monitored for continuing threats to
public safety. Access to homes may be denied for extended periods of
time. Assuming, again, the presence of an actual public health emergency,
none of these measures would likely require that compensation be paid to
the property owner or lessee.
Like the other legal geographies discussed in this part, a Geography of
Contagion, which will be based principally upon territorial isolation and
quarantine, will raise substantial liberty concerns. The Constitution will
not cease to apply or operate within this specific geography. Neither,
however, will it likely prevent substantial territorial displacements from
being enacted and enforced.

458. See Batlan, supra note 35, at 60 ("[I]n the past, quarantines have been infused with issues of
race, class, and gender placing the greatest hardships on those who failed to conform to white middleclass norms of behavior.").
459. See James G. Hodge, Jr., Implementing Modern Public Health Goals Through Government:
An Examination of New Federalism and Public Health Law, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 93,
104 (1997) (noting danger of discriminatory treatment during public health emergencies).
460. See Batlan, supra note 35, at 60 (noting stigmatic effects of past quarantines).
461. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (absent proof of discriminatory intent, a
generally applicable law with disparate effects does not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
462. Prevention of harm or nuisance has been considered to negate the compensation requirement.
See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485-93 (1987); Goldblatt
v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 593 (1962).
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL DISPLACEMENT AND SPATIAL GAPS
As Part III demonstrated, territorial displacements implicate an
expansive array of constitutional provisions-the limitation on suspension
of habeas corpus, 463 the Equal Protection Clause, 464 the Due Process
Clause,465 the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause,466 the Privileges or Immunities Clause,467 the Ex Post Facto Clause
and Bill of Attainder Clause,468 the Takings Clause, 469 and the First
Amendment. 470 Protection against certain territorial displacements may
also be found in constitutional structures like the Dormant Commerce
Clause, the citizenship principles of Article IV and the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Supremacy Clause. 471
Nevertheless, as we have seen protection against territorial and
corresponding constitutional displacements remains rather thin,
particularly with respect to certain disfavored persons and groups. As the
antecedent and contemporary displacements discussed in Part III show, the
Constitution contains some rather significant extra-territorial and intraterritorial spatial gaps. Legal Geographies of Displacement take root in
these fissures, with serious and, in some cases, continuing effects on
personal liberty. Although we cannot close these spatial gaps entirely, this
fmal Part examines the general process of constitutional gap closure and
suggests several avenues toward at least narrowing some of our
contemporary gaps. To better understand why such measures are
necessary, however, we must first take full measure of the scope and effect
of the constitutional displacement brought about by territorial laws and
tactics.
A. Constitutional Displacement

In a world in which borders are sometimes said to be less and less
relevant, territory remains critical to both governance and constitutional
liberty. Territorial displacement continues to be an expedient
governmental response to real and, in some cases, merely perceived

463.
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
!d. amend. XIV.
!d. amend. V; id. amend. XIV.
!d. amend. VIII.
!d. amend. XIV, § 1.
Id. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3.
!d. amend. V.
!d. amend. I.
!d. art. IV,§ 2; id. amend. XIV; id. art. VI,§ 2.
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societal threats. From the perspective of lawmakers, territorial
displacement is often a viable and even attractive option, in part because
the displaced lack any effective political representation. It is no mere
coincidence that from Jim Crow to Guantanamo, legal and constitutional
displacements have been imposed on persons already in some sense alien
to and displaced from the Constitution's protective orbit.
Many of the territorial displacements discussed in Part III came about
as a result of public fear and demonization-of, for example, African
Americans during Jim Crow, aliens and the foreign-born during wartime,
and the diseased during periods of scientific uncertainty. Cyclical
economic downturns seem always to increase public awareness of and
focus upon migrants and immigrants, who officials then seek to remove or
displace owing to their alleged connection to depressed wages,
unemployment, and other social ills. As demonstrated by early state
migratory exclusion laws, criminals-including most recently the derided
class of released sex offenders-have always been targets of territorial
displacement. The urge to banish and displace them, through
imprisonment or other means, has always been strong. The poor, as well,
have historically engendered a substantial degree of public antipathy;
displacement has been used to situate them out of public sight and mind.
Although the specific means of displacement have changed, the general
pattern of displacement has been remarkably consistent over time. Nothing
as blunt and sweeping as what David Delaney described as the "hyperterritoriality" of racial segregation presently exists. 472 But new, more
subtle, methods of displacement have arisen which similarly diminish or
exterminate constitutional protections for certain purportedly troublesome
populations. Contemporary lines are often more narrowly drawn to
exclude or expel; but they are often no less effective at displacing persons
and groups. Individuals and groups subjected to racial segregation,
internment, territorial expulsion, "internal exile,"473 purification, and
isolation have been treated as if they exist somewhere beyond the
Constitution's domain. As we have seen, the effects of territoriality on
constitutional liberty can be quite severe.
Fundamental physical liberties are, of course, substantially affected by
territorial restrictions. The displaced are denied-by legal and physical
barriers and sometimes force-the liberty to choose their own place. For
example, the territoriality of racial segregation denied black citizens the

472. DELANEY, supra note 141, at 96.

473. Yung, supra note 22, at 111.
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right to occupy the same territory on an equal basis with white citizens.
Internment of Japanese Americans, involuntary confmement of the
destitute, sick, and mentally ill, and extended quarantines of those believed
to be contagious all denied people the most basic liberty-to be free from
physical restraints unless and until due process is provided. Today,
detention at Guantanamo Bay and other less visible sites of displacement
affect the same fundamental liberty. Restrictions on migration, whether by
citizens or aliens, also affect freedoms of mobility and inter-territorial
movement. Residency exclusions for sex offenders may preclude both
locomotion and presence in chosen communities. Urban purification
measures affect the basic liberty to be present in designated public places,
and the right to choose one's own place.
We have seen that existing constitutional concepts, doctrines, and
modes of reasoning do a rather poor job of capturing the breadth and depth
of harms associated with territorial displacement. Narrow legalistic
conceptions of liberty-freedom of movement or freedom from physical
restraint-tend to focus mostly on displacement's effects on the body. But
the harms associated with the territorial displacements examined in this
Article extend well beyond such physical effects. 474 In addition to their
basic physical effects, each of the Geographies of Displacement discussed
in Part III limits the most fundamental of personal choices: where and with
whom to live; where and how to work; where one may recreate; which, if
any, institutions of justice are available; and even which acts of basic
sustenance one may perform in a public place.
Territorial displacements also have a substantial communicative
element. As noted earlier, for decades courts turned a blind eye to the
symbolic or communicative aspect of systematic racial-spatial
segregation-in particular, the deep stigma that accompanied displacement
on racial grounds. Racial segregation was harmful not merely because of
its severe effects on the body-the denial of freedom of movement and
limits on physical presence-but because of what it indicated with respect
to African Americans' personhood and dignity. 475 Territorial
displacements such as racial segregation, internment, and even quarantine

474. We must not, however, minimize those effects. In some instances, it is not an overstatement
to say that the right to exist is at stake. As Jeremy Waldron has observed, urban purification measures
affect not only constitutional liberties like the right to beg, but interests that are "basic to the
sustenance of a decent or healthy life, in some cases basic to the sustenance of life itself." Waldron,
supra note 422, at 320 (emphasis added).
475. For an insightful discussion of race and dignity, see Christopher A. Bracey, Dignity in Race
Jurisprudence, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 669 (2005).
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have all communicated something negative with regard to personal status,
worth, and belonging. 476
Ouster from a territory also entails denial of membership in a
community. To be cast out of a territory is to be denied a measure of one's
personhood. The geographer Don Mitchell treats the harm caused by
displacement of the homeless owing to urban purification as a form of
social delegitimization. 477 Mitchell's discussion of the homeless accurately
conveys the type and degree of harm visited upon many other displaced
persons as well. Measures that segregate, exclude, expel, and isolate
territorially often brand persons as inferior. 478 Displaced persons are not
only physically, but also symbolically, cast out of various geographies and
places: entire continents, states, communities, workplaces, residences,
streets, public parks, and even local parking lots. The intent, if not the
actual effect, is to cause their physical, legal, and juridical disappearance.
As noted in Part III, the Constitution, as presently interpreted, often fails to
account for these deeper effects of territoriality.
Finally, as we have seen, territorial restrictions tend to cast a rather
wide net insofar as constitutional liberties are concerned. Exile,
internment, and detention often affect a range of fundamental libertiesfreedom of association, freedom of expression and assembly, access to the
courts, and pursuit of a calling or profession. Spatial liberties thus cannot
be assessed in isolation; they are often necessary prerequisites for the
enjoyment of a variety of constitutionalliberties. 479 In this sense, as well,
liberties of place are constitutive of full personhood. In sum, territoriality's
effects on constitutional liberty are often far deeper and more severe than
traditional constitutional analysis recognizes.
These effects are often magnified where governments operate in
response to crises and emergencies. As the discussion of antecedent and
contemporary displacements in Part III showed, territorial displacement is
often imposed in response to troubling economic, social, and political
events. The fact that territorial displacement tends to be associated with
what we might call "emergency governance"---official acts taken during
times of war and social strife-may help explain the diminished
constitutional protection sometimes granted to those displaced. 480 But this

476. See, e.g., Batlan, supra note 35, at 60 (noting stigmatic effect of quarantines).
477. See MITCHELL, supra note 394, at 136-37.
478. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 117, at 199.
479. See Zick, Space, Place, and Speech, supra note 2 (noting primacy of place to First
Amendment freedoms).
480. See generally Meyler, supra note 451 (discussing emergency governance).
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is only a partial explanation. As demonstrated in Part III and explained
below, constitutional displacement is only possible owing to the presence
of substantial spatial gaps in constitutional structures and rights
provisions.
B. External and Internal Spatial Gaps

As we have seen, the Constitution has been successfully invoked in
certain instances to combat particular territorial displacements. In the
main, however, the constitutional tools for dealing with territorial
displacement are either absent or rather ill-suited to the task. The
Constitution contains what we might refer to, and conceptualize as, spatial
gaps.
As explained in Part II, the Framers of the Constitution were acutely
sensitive to certain spatial matters. Indeed, in some respects, they were
masters of geo-strategy. Thus, for example, the Framers provided clear
spatial directives concerning the importance of territory to matters such as
sovereignty, internal governance, and defense. 481 They were far less clear,
however, with regard to the importance of territory to constitutional scope
and individual liberties. Fashioned without the "prolixity of a legal code,"
the Constitution leaves many critical spatial and territorial issues
unresolved. 482 Moreover, the Framers acted at a time when cartographic
borders were generally considered to be fixed-matters of brute, as
opposed to social and political, fact. As a result of these and other factors,
the Framers bequeathed to future generations a variety of vexatious extraterritorial and intra-territorial spatial gaps.
The Constitution's extra-territorial gaps have been widely noted and
commented upon, including in the recent group of Guantanamo detention
cases. 483 The issue is fundamentally one of constitutional scope or domain.
As noted in Part II, the Framers did not speak with a clear voice with
regard to whether the Constitution "follows the flag" when the United
States acts beyond its territorial borders. 484 As Gerald Neuman has
observed: "Defining the domain of constitutionalism has major practical
implications for immigration policy, the conduct of foreign affairs,
military action, and the participation of American citizens in an

481. See, e.g., supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
482. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 159,200 (1819).
483. See, e.g., NEUMAN, supra note 39; Cleveland, supra note 38; Louis Henkin, The Constitution
as Compact and as Conscience: Individual Rights Abroad and at Our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv.
11,23-24 (1985); Kent, supra note 38; Raustiala, The Geography ofJustice, supra note 14.
484. RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG?, supra note 14.
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increasingly global society."485 The geographies of justice and
membership, in particular, bear this out.
There are myriad positions with regard to constitutional scope or
domain. At one extreme, scholars argue that the Constitution's limitations
"appear to apply to the national government, regardless of where, and
against whom, it acts."486 But other scholars and commentators reject
universal application of the Bill of Rights; they deny that the Constitution
follows the flag to any territory outside United States borders. 487 Still
others stake out a middle ground, arguing that some, but not all,
constitutional guarantees apply outside our borders. 488 The Supreme Court
has not definitively settled the matter of the Constitution's geographic
domain-even as to United States citizens. 489 As a result of this
uncertainty, persons detained or otherwise subject to United States
authority abroad cannot be sure of the scope or extent of their
constitutional liberties.
This lack of clarity with regard to constitutional scope or domain has
created certain incentives and opportunities for governmental
manipulation of territory. Thus, for example, in recent years the Bush
administration has simultaneously argued both that displacement of enemy
aliens to Guantanamo Bay extinguishes constitutional liberties and that
mere presence of an enemy alien on United States soil does not itself
guarantee any basic constitutionalliberties. 490
In Boumediene, the Supreme Court appeared to reject a narrowly
territorial definition of constitutional domain. 491 The Court applied a
functional standard for determining the geographic scope of the

485. NEUMAN, supra note 39, at 3.
486. Cleveland, supra note 38, at 19. See LOlliS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY AND
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 99-100 (1990) (arguing that Bill of Rights embodied a "universal human rights
ideology").
487. See Kent, supra note 38 (making textual and historical arguments against universal
application of constitutional rights).
488. As Gerald Neuman observes, courts and scholars have adopted several theoretical approaches
to constitutional scope. NEUMAN, supra note 39, at 5-8 (discussing universalism, membership,
mutuality, and global due process approaches).
489. See id. at 93-94 (noting lack of consensus on Court); see also INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468
U.S. 1032 (1984) (majority of the Court assumed that illegal aliens who enter United States territory
have Fourth Amendment rights); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (holding
that Fourth Amendment did not apply to search of Mexican residence of Mexican citizen who had no
voluntary attachment to the United States); United States ex rei. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279
(1904) (holding that excludable alien is not entitled to First Amendment rights).
490. With regard to the latter position, see Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008)
(per curiam), cert. granted, 2008 WL 4326485.
491. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229,2262 (2008).
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Suspension Clause. 492 Under that test, territory still matters-but only as
one of several factors, including a range of "practical" considerations
associated with extending the domain of habeas corpus. 493 While this
narrows the territorial gap somewhat, it is difficult to tell just how much
and, as noted earlier, with regard to which specific constitutional
guarantees. 494 The Constitution's extra-territorial gaps will undoubtedly be
the subject of future litigation-by aliens and detainees located both
abroad and within the United States. If Boumediene's functional approach
is any indication, we shall likely continue to see the Constitution's domain
decided in an ad hoc, case-by-case fashion.
In considering the Constitution as a unique spatial framework, less
noted intra-territorial gaps also become readily apparent. For example, the
constitutional status of aliens located within United States territory has
always been somewhat uncertain. Presence within certain territories, such
as states, explicitly entitles all persons to certain liberties. 495 But as we
have seen, presence on United States soil is not the brute fact the Framers
appear to have assumed it to be. As well, with very few exceptionsnotably that of the home-the Framers' conception of liberty related
primarily to persons rather than places. 496
Although they obviously contemplated that persons would migrate
from territory to territory, the Framers failed to elaborate with any
precision the parameters of one's right to mobility or migration. Nor did
they articulate any fundamental right to public presence. Indeed, the
Constitution very nearly failed to mention public places at all. 497 And it
does not, of course, contain any explicit recognition of human dignity or
personhood. As a result of these omissions, those who are displaced
through territorial exclusion, internal exile, purification, isolation, and
quarantine often fall squarely within some of the Constitution's internal
spatial gaps.
My primary goals have been to highlight the critical intersection of
territory and constitutional liberty and, in particular, to demonstrate the
many ways in which territoriality restricts or denies certain liberties. This
Article does not offer any grand gap-closing constitutional method or
theory. But once we recognize the dangers constitutional displacement

492.
493.
494.
495.
496.
497.

!d. at 2259 (articulating several important factors).
!d.
See generally Neuman, supra note 11 (discussing the issues left undecided by Boumediene).
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (granting certain liberties to all "persons" within a state).
See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
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poses to liberty and liberal democracy, the next logical step is to begin to
think about how we might narrow the Constitution's spatial gaps. The
fmal part of the Article offers some general ideas in pursuit of this limited
goal.
C. Narrowing or Closing Constitutional Gaps

Before briefly addressing some narrowing suggestions, we should note
that history contains important lessons regarding what might be considered
the process by which the Constitution's spatial gaps are narrowed or
closed. Among other things, the course of the antecedent displacements
discussed in Part III shows that we cannot look solely, or even primarily,
to the courts in seeking to fill external and internal spatial gaps.
As the courses of racial territoriality and Japanese internment (to take
just two examples) show, gap narrowing or closure is a complex legal,
social, and political process. While judicial decisions have certainly been
catalysts in this process, social and political forces have arguably been as,
or more, significant in extending liberty and constitutional personhood to
the previously displaced. In particular, the passage of time-and with it,
the emergency or perceived threat-and marked changes in societal
attitudes have been essential elements of prior spatial gap closings. In
some instances, notably racial segregation and internment, the nation has
come to regret territorial and constitutional displacements. Once the
purported emergency has passed, polities have reconsidered the morality
and effectiveness of displacement. In the case of World War II
internments, actual remedial measures were adopted, although well after
the fact.
While gap closure or narrowing can often be a lengthy and involved
social, political, and constitutional process, there are steps we can take to
encourage and hasten the filling of some of the more prominent spatial
gaps in constitutional coverage. In short, because of territory's connection
to fundamental liberties and the substantial harm that attends its
manipulation by government, we ought to de-emphasize territory abroad
and re-emphasize it in various domestic contexts.
1. De-Spatializing Justice

The Framers drafted a constitutional framework that incorporated a
particular conception of cartographic borders. Those borders were
primarily, although not exclusively, necessary to support claims of
sovereign status on behalf of the new nation. In a pre-globalized world,
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cartographic borders were self-evident. At least, they were apparent
enough to make physical presence within the states and the United States
(and its territories) determinative of rights and status in some limited
circumstances. The Framers did not, of course, map territorial boundaries
for all time and purposes. 498 But neither did they foresee the ease with
which those boundaries could be manipulated. Initially through physical
expansion (empire-building), and more recently as a result of
globalization, it has fallen to the Framers' "posterity" to resolve pressing
questions of constitutional domain. 499
As noted in Part II, the Framers did not make a clear choice among
"territorial," "universal," or other approaches to constitutional domain or
scope. 50° Courts and scholars have struggled with issues of constitutional
domain for decades, with no position gaining universal acceptance.
Questions of whether and, if so, to what extent constitutional liberties
extend to persons located in territories outside the United States' borders
are far too complex to be fully engaged in this Article. But certain lessons
regarding constitutional gap narrowing or closure and the de-spatialization
of justice can be gleaned from the legal, moral, and political battles
relating to Guantanamo Bay and other war-on-terror displacements.
For some time now, there has been general support in the legal
academy for closing Guantanamo's constitutional "loophole."501 Some of
this movement relates to rejection of the narrow territorial conception of
the Constitution's domain. 502 Beyond this, however, the war on terrorism
has demonstrated to many that the spatialization of justice is inconsistent
with basic social, legal, and moral precepts. Professor Kal Raustiala has
argued that "legal spatiality"-the notion that constitutional liberty varies
with location-"is at odds with contemporary concepts of jurisdiction,
with the intensifying trend of globalization, and with our most cherished
principles of constitutionalism."503 As Professor Raustiala demonstrates,
territorial sovereignty has been gradually eroding across various legal and

498. For example, new states may be admitted to the union. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
499. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
500. NEUMAN, supra note 39, at 5-8 (discussing four prominent approaches to constitutional
domain).

501. Gerald L. Neuman, Closing the Guantanamo Loophole, 50 LOY. L. REv. 1, 50 (2004)
(arguing against power to manipulate physical location in order to exploit right-less territories); Owen
Piss, The War Against Terrorism and the Rule ofLaw, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 252 (2006).
502. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 483, at 23-24 (arguing for a universalist approach). The
literature on universalism is summarized in Kent, supra note 38, at 481-84.
503. Raustiala, The Geography ofJustice, supra note 14, at 2504.
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political fronts. As a result, he says, "where one sits does not necessarily
determine what legal rules one sits under." 504
Still, as Professor Raustiala also notes, "the federal courts continue to
cling to the notion that American law is tethered to territory-that simply
by moving an individual around in space, the rights that individual enjoys
wax and wane." 505 It is not only courts, but executive and legislative
officials, who continue to cling to the spatialization of justice.
Guantanamo, black sites, and the practice of rendition are all examples of
a legal spatiality firmly rooted in the territorial conception of
constitutional scope.
The pressure that had been building in the courts for some time to
squarely address hyper-spatialization of the rule of law reached a
crescendo in Boumediene. There the Court, in the face of a blatant attempt
by the executive and legislative branches to not merely regulate but
manipulate territory, partially de-spatialized constitutional liberty by
granting geographically distant detainees a right of access to the courts. 506
In effect, the Court narrowed one significant spatial gap in constitutional
domain-access to habeas corpus.
Owing to the considerable complications that would attend outright
globalization of all constitutional rights, including demands for such rights
by wartime detainees captured and detained in places other than
Guantanamo, it should come as no surprise that the Boumediene Court did
not simply adopt a universalist interpretation of constitutional domain. But
the Court's functional approach to territory and constitutional scope may
tum out to be quite significant in terms of extending constitutional liberty
to those detained outside the United States. The Court made it clear that
blatant territorial manipulation by the executive and legislative branches
would not be tolerated. As discussed in Part III, it adopted an objective
approach that asks, among other things, whether the United States
exercises "effective control" over a territory. 507 Whether this approach
extends the rule of law to territories other than Guantanamo Bay remains
to be determined.
The Court has not acted in isolation, of course. Extra-judicial aspects of
constitutional gap narrowing have also been at work. In particular, the

504. !d. at 2512.
505. !d. at 2504. See also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (holding that
Fourth Amendment does not apply to search of property in foreign country belonging to nonresident
alien); Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev'd, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (limiting
habeas rights to U.S. territory).
506. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 229.
507. !d. at 2244.
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passage of time and constant reporting on topics such as detainee
treatment, torture, and legal process, may have caused some decline in
public support for the Guantanamo detention scheme (as well, it should be
noted, for the more aggressive aspects of the war on terrorism). 508 Broader
shifts in political and societal attitudes, both in the United States and
abroad, also appear to be occurring. Supreme Court decisions rejecting
various aspects of the Bush administration's territorialism strategy have
likely been catalysts in this regard. But in a larger sense, this is a matter of
stepping back from contemporary legal spatiality and reflecting on its
morality and its consistency with national values.
Although it may not have initially been readily apparent to many,
spatialization of detainee rights shares a historical lineage with the
spatialization of race. As Sarah Cleveland has noted, the present-day logic
of extra-territorial detention is rooted in "a peculiarly unattractive, latenineteenth-century nationalist and racist view of American society and
federal power."509 Professor Cleveland is referring in particular to the
rationale for the Insular Cases, which refused to extend full constitutional
protections to some U.S. territories based largely on the view that the
inhabitants of those territories were not sufficiently "civilized."510 Like
those cases, the developing Geography of Justice, including the
Guantanamo detention system, is based upon justifications that often
"parade as enumerated text without any recognition either of the
international law origins of the principles or the racist, illiberal ideology
on which they are based."511 Gerald Neuman has stated the matter more
bluntly: "Maintaining [the detainees] as rightless outlaws because of their
captive status revives the logic of slavery .... " 512
Assuming we have collectively rejected territorial manipulation as a
national defense, it may indeed be possible, as one anti-universalist
commentator suggests, for alien detainees and those rendered to other
territories to be protected "by diplomacy, treaties, the law of nations
(today's customary international law), and nonconstitutional policy
choices of the political branches."513 Treaties and diplomacy will only

508. During the recent presidential election, President-elect Obama pledged to close Guantanamo
Bay and condemned U.S. torture of detainees. James Traub, Is (His) Biography (Our) Destiny?, N.Y.
TIMES MAGAZINE, Nov. 4, 2007, at 650.
509. Cleveland, supra note 38, at 14.
510. !d. at 219.
511. !d. at 278.
512. Neuman, supra note 501, at 50.
513. Kent, supra note 38, at 465.
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work, of course, if American officials agree to be bound by these
processes. 514
Of course, the most direct way to close the Guantanamo loophole, and
thus to narrow the extra-territorial gap in which it sits, is for the executive
branch to voluntarily close it. As this Article was going to print, President
Obama issued executive orders indicating his intention to close the prison
at Guantanamo Bay within a year and to end the program of secret
detentions for enemy combatants .. 515 In a relatively short span of time, one
of the Constitution's territorial gaps has been substantially narrowed. In
historical terms, the pace of this particular aspect of the de-spatialization
of justice has been remarkably rapid. Still, it remains to be seen whether
the pressures associated with fighting terrorism will lead to other forms of
displacement during the present administration. One of the most important
questions, yet unanswered, is the extent to which constitutional domain
will be interpreted in future cases to extend outside United States
territorial boundaries. As others have noted, however it occurs, the despatialization of justice for "enemy combatants" and others detained under
United States policies and authority would be welcome. As Owen Fiss has
observed, "it must be remembered that the issue is not just the survival of
the nation--of course the United States will survive-but rather the terms
of survival."516

2. The Spatialization ofDomestic Liberty
The responses to the Constitution's extra-territorial gaps show that gap
narrowing or closure is a product of political, social, and legal forces. The
same is true of the various responses to the Constitution's internal spatial
gaps-those that affect what we might call domestic spatial liberties.
Within our (cartographic) borders, certain persons fall within spatial gaps
in constitutional protection. Given the variety of interests at stake,
including those of undocumented aliens, sex offenders, the destitute, and
the sick, narrowing these spatial gaps is in many respects a more
complicated endeavor than narrowing the gaps arising from a strictly
territorial conception of the Constitution's domain.

514. See Satterthwaite, supra note 13, at 1400 (noting how Bush Administration has avoided
treaty limits on rendition).
515. See Mark Mazzetti & William Glaberson, Obama Issues Directive to Shut Down
Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21,2009, Al.
516. Fiss, supra note 501, at 256.

2009]

CONSTITUTIONAL DISPLACEMENT

601

Here, again, we ought to remember that even the most pern1c10us
territorial abuses in our history-racial segregation and internmentultimately took many decades to address and were not resolved by courts
alone. In the interim, however, certain spatial adjustments may serve to
narrow some of the Constitution's internal gaps. Briefly, these gapnarrowing measures consist of ( 1) increased oversight regarding the
official manipulation of United States borders; (2) recognition of limited,
implicit spatial liberty interests; (3) more careful attention to and
application of the Constitution's spatial structure, especially its federalism
aspects; and (4) constitutional theory-building that begins to incorporate
notions of territorial disadvantage. Each of these aspects of what should
obviously be considered a rudimentary spatialization agenda is discussed
briefly in this final part.
There is one particular context in which the Constitution's extraterritorial and intra-territorial gaps intersect. Owing to the territorial
conception of constitutional domain, the legal mapping of geographic
borders can be determinative of access to fundamental liberties like due
process and equality. But as Ayelet Shachar has recently noted, the "legal
boundaries of inclusion and exclusion" no longer correlate neatly with
U.S. "cartographic" borders. 517 Recent legal and policy changes at the
federal level have altered the location of the nation's borders, "at times
penetrating into the interior, in other circumstances extending beyond the
edge of the territory." 518
For purposes of determining legal admission, Congress has stated that
the territorial border is not fixed but is to be "designated by the Attorney
General."519 By replacing fixed and static borders with dynamic and
moveable ones, policymakers can often manipulate the border in a manner
"that best suits the goal of restricting access." 520 In certain instances, this
means that even those aliens who are physically present within the United
States will be treated as if they never entered; as a result, even minimal
rights of due process and equality explicitly granted by the Constitution to
those on United States soil will not apply. 521
Whatever its flaws, at least the formalistic territorial approach granted
aliens a degree of certainty with regard to basic constitutional liberties. In

517. Shachar, supra note 16, at 166. See also LEGAL BORDERLANDS: LAW AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN BORDERS (Mary L. Dudziak & Leti Volpp eds., 2006).
518. Shachar, supra note 16, at 166.
519. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2000).
520. Shachar, supra note 16, at 167.
521. See id. at 171 (comparing physical act of "entry" to evolving legal concept of "admission").
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more general terms, as Linda Bosniak has argued, political and communal
membership are properly treated as matters of social fact rather than legal
formality. 522 What Bosniak calls "ethical territoriality"-the idea that
liberties and recognition ought to extend to all persons within a particular
territory-is, as she says, more consistent with "the egalitarian and anticaste commitments to which liberal constitutionalism purports to
aspire." 523
If United States territory is no longer static and cartographic but is
more accurately described, according to Shachar, as a "complex,
multilayered, and ever-transforming border, one that is drawn and
redrawn, through the words of law and acts of regulatory agencies, to
better [calibrate] the admitting state's exclusion lines in response to new
global changes,"524 then government will effectively be empowered to
displace aliens more or less at will. This, however, is one instance in
which the Framers were quite clear with regard to territory's connection to
domestic liberties. In at least some respects, the Framers themselves
aspired to ethical territoriality. 525
The (re-)spatialization of domestic justice and liberty in this particular
respect will require, at a minimum, a more robust judicial role in setting
limits on immigration policy and enforcement. Like many immigration
measures, the recent alterations to the country's "legal border" are based in
Congress's plenary power over immigration. 526 The plenary power
doctrine largely immunizes federal immigration and naturalization
measures from constitutional scrutiny. As T. Alexander Aleinikoff and
others have argued, however, the doctrine of plenary power rests on a
rather shaky foundation. 527 The doctrine is based, at least in part, upon
norms of deference to the political branches. 528 Professor Aleinikoff casts
serious doubt on the notion that the usual constitutional norms governing
judicial avoidance of "political questions" support a plenary power over
immigration. 529 The malleability of the concept of "the border" provides
one more reason for courts to more actively scrutinize immigration laws

522. Bosniak, supra note 55, at 392.
523. Id. at 392.
524. Shachar, supra note 16, at 193.
525. There were, of course, some instances in which the Framers fell far short of this aspirationslavery being the most obvious instance.
526. Chin, supra note 178.
527. See T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE
STATE,ANDAMERICANCITIZENSHIP 151-81 (2002).
528. See id. at 154-59 (discussing institutional deference rationale).
529. See id. at 160 (discussing political question doctrine).
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and policies. Given recent events, judicial skepticism with regard to
agency territorial claims is certainly warranted. Again, the Bush
administration simultaneously insisted on a static notion of territory in one
context (detention of combatants), while relying on a far more dynamic
and flexible approach in another (immigration). Basic notions of fairness
dictate that courts inquire whether and, if so, under what circumstances,
constitutional liberties expressly tied to territorial presence ought to be
decoupled from expedient redefinitions of"the border."
As we have seen, the constitutional tools available for analyzing many
domestic territorial displacements-the First Amendment, the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause, the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Equal
Protection Clause, etc.-are often rather unsuited to the task. Thus, for
example, the Constitution's liberty provisions have been interpreted not to
preclude a lifetime ban on a sex offender's presence in certain public
places, sex offender exclusion zones that require people to live in isolated
areas, or a requirement that the destitute sleep in shelters rather than on the
streets. 530 Some relief has been granted those who wish to occupy local
territory for specific purposes, such as speech or charitable association; as
noted in Part III, in one extraordinary case day laborers prevailed under
the Equal Protection Clause on a claim of official harassment. 531 As noted
below, constitutional structures such as federalism may provide another
limited avenue for relief with respect to certain local displacements.
One thing that is missing, by and large, from judicial and scholarly
analyses of contemporary territorial displacements is recognition of certain
implied spatial liberty interests. Recognition and enforcement of basic
liberties like locomotion, public presence, and intrastate movement would
help spatialize domestic liberty and narrow certain internal constitutional
gaps. Most of us quite naturally take such basic liberties for granted. For
those affected by the Geographies of Punishment, Purification, and
Contagion, however, these liberties are either substantially diminished or,
in some cases, denied altogether.
Justice Douglas once referred to the basic right to locomotionwalking, strolling, wandering, and loafing-as one of the Constitution's
"unwritten amenities."532 Although Justice Douglas was speaking in
particular of the exercise of First Amendment rights, the concept may be

530. See supra notes 340-74, 424--28 and accompanying text.
531. Doe v. Village of Mamaroneck, 462 F. Supp. 2d 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
532. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972). See also City of Chicago v.
Morales, 572 U.S. 41, 53 (1999) (plurality opinion) (noting that "freedom to loiter" is protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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applied more broadly. Although the Constitution does not speak in explicit
terms of the right to make basic choices regarding place or location, as
explained earlier this amenity is indeed critical to full constitutional
personhood. Measures that threaten immigrants with trespass citations for
merely being in a particular place, exclude day laborers from parking lots
and street corners, deny released sex offenders the liberty to move about in
public, and cleanse or purify certain public areas of the homeless and
destitute affect the spirit as well as the body. This is not to suggest that
anyone has a right to be in or traverse a particular place without regard to
public needs like safety or health. Territorial displacements ought to be
enacted and reviewed, however, with the full breadth of their negative
effects on personal independence, self-confidence, and dignity firmly in
mind.
One of the more glaring domestic spatial gaps in the Constitution
relates to liberty of access to public places. Some of the territorial
displacements discussed in this Article appear to be premised on the
notion that there is no right to simply be present in public places. In one
case, the Seventh Circuit expressly held that the right to be in a public
park, even for wholly innocent purposes, is not "fundamental."533 In
another, the Ninth Circuit indicated that the destitute have no right to
remain in public so long as the government has made shelter available for
them. 534 There is indeed nothing explicit in the text of the Constitution
regarding the right to occupy public places or territories. This fact has
occasionally given rise to the "libertarian fantasy" -a property regime in
which all places are effectively privatized. 535
Putting aside any "unwritten amenities," however, the Constitution's
text strongly suggests that this is indeed pure fantasy. The First
Amendment guarantees to "the People" liberty to "peaceably assemble"
and to "petition" government. 536 This contemplates some public venue in
which to assemble and from which to present grievances. Moreover, the
Supreme Court has stated that government holds quintessential public
places like streets and parks "in trust" for the people. 537 Expressly or
implicitly privatizing all public places is incompatible with that trust
arrangement. Finally, our history and traditions most certainly support a

533. Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 770 (7th Cir. 2004).
534. Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2006).
535. Waldron, supra note 422, at 300 (noting that some libertarians propose to sell the streets to
private interests). See also MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, FOR A NEW LIBERTY 201-02 (1973) (advocating
privatization of all land areas).
536. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
537. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
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general right to public presence. The American Revolution, the Civil
Rights Movement, and countless other watershed events have taken place
in public areas and territories-and in full public view. 538 The right to be
and remain in public places for legitimate, lawful purposes ought not to be
narrowly limited to expressive exercises. 539 Nor ought it to be deemed
contingent upon the government failing to designate some other, more
"suitable," place to which the destitute or other marginalized persons must
relocate.
The liberty to move about within states and localities ought also to be
considered one of the Constitution's "unwritten amenities." Americans are
a mobile people, and local movement is critical to activities like pursuit of
livelihood, intimate association, and even recreation. Again, recognition of
such a liberty interest would not mean that a person has the right to go
anyplace she wishes. It would, however, require that state and local
officials justify territorial restrictions that deter migration. This might, in
tum, deter some localities from enacting restrictive measures regarding
matters like immigration and sex offender exclusion. It might also temper
or limit the scope of contagion measures like quarantine. It makes no
logical sense to deny a state the power to prohibit the movement of
paupers or other unwanted populations across its borders, 540 but to grant
towns and counties that same basic authority. The Supreme Court ought to
fmally recognize a fundamental right to local migration. In the meantime,
however, lower courts remain free to and ought to do so.
Greater attention must also be given to the serious structural issues
raised by certain local territorial displacements. For example, Wayne
Logan has suggested that sex offender residency exclusion zones offend
collectivist principles associated with the Dormant Commerce Clause. 541
As more jurisdictions essentially banish their own sex offenders, tens of
thousands of individuals are likely to be forced to migrate elsewhere.
Those displaced are likely to face similar residency restrictions in other
states. If this trend continues, a segment of society may effectively be
rendered "stateless." As noted earlier, the Framers expressly demanded
that territorial localism be submerged in favor of structural interests like

538. Public expressive activity, including mass political contention, from colonial times to the
present is described in ZICK, supra note 42, at 25-64.
539. Public presence itself advances claims to identity, recognition, and communal belonging. See
generally MITCHELL, supra note 394 (examining benefits to homeless of public presence).
540. See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (invalidating state law impeding interstate
travel of indigent persons).
541. Logan, supra note 23, at 23-31.
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national unity. 542 In the likely event states and localities cannot be
convinced to bend to collective interests, Congress (or the courts) must
provide a remedy. 543 Similar considerations apply with respect to the
recent rash of local immigration measures, which are creating a patchwork
of displacements across the United States. Undocumented aliens have no
right to stay. Even if we are not prepared to welcome undocumented aliens
into the national political community, however, a uniform solution to the
matter is preferable to a system of local territorial defense measures and
sanctuary cities. Insofar as territorial displacements affect such collective
interests, we ought to look to the Constitution's structural principles for
political and judicial remedies.
Finally, some concerted effort ought to be made to further incorporate
territorial displacements into constitutional and political theories. For
instance, displacement often creates castes of second-class citizens
through territorial delegitimization. This was certainly clear with regard to
antecedent displacements of African Americans and Japanese Americans.
As Part III showed, however, today disfavored status applies to
undocumented immigrants, sex offenders, and the homeless; it may also
conceivably affect victims of certain pandemics. Through territory, certain
persons are being rendered legal and societal "pariahs."544
As defined by Professors Farber and Sherry: "To be a pariah is to be
shunned and isolated, to be treated as if one had a loathsome and
contagious disease." 545 Farber and Sherry's claim is that imposing
"pariah" status on a person or group is a quintessential violation of
constitutional equality. To be sure, Farber and Sherry state that the pariah
principle is "at its strongest when the individuals so targeted are not
responsible for their status."546 But they also state that the principle "has
force even where the individual bears some responsibility." 547 At least in
its most extreme forms, constitutional displacement gives rise to the same
fundamental concern at the heart of the pariah principle, namely the ability
of those displaced to "participate in civil society."548 Territoriality can
make such participation extraordinarily burdensome or even impossible.
Theories of social justice might also inform analysis of territorial and
constitutional displacements. Each Geography of Displacement distributes

542.
543.
544.
545.
546.
547.
548.

See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
See Logan, supra note 23, at 31-35 (discussing possible remedies).
Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 257 (1996).
!d. at 266.
!d. at 268.
!d.
!d. at 272.
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rights to social and political participation through the good of territory. As
Michael Walzer observed in Spheres of Justice, communities have a basic
right to determine the rules and regulations of membership. 549 Walzer
noted, however, that in liberal societies this right must sometimes be
constricted. In particular, liberalism requires that needy populations like
the homeless not be entirely excluded. 550 Even the sex offender, whatever
else he has forfeited, has not waived membership and participation in civil
society altogether or indefinitely. In more general terms, scholars and
policymakers ought to consider the critical social justice implications of
territorial and constitutional displacement. 551
In sum, we can improve constitutional analysis of domestic territorial
restrictions by spatializing domestic liberty in various respects.
Scrutinizing the government's manipulation of the cartographic border
may preserve explicit territorial liberties. Basic liberty interests in
locomotion, presence, and intrastate movement ought also to be
recognized. Limits on territorial displacement, including those that are
implicit in the Constitution's spatial framework, ought to be respected.
Finally, as we think about the implications of territorial governance, we
ought to incorporate displacement into constitutional, political, and social
justice theories. These alterations will, of course, not prevent territorial or
constitutional displacements from occurring. They are, however, important
first steps for a liberal democracy.
V. CONCLUSION

Locational and spatial liberties, including freedom of movement and
choice of place, are so fundamental to dignity and personhood that most of
us simply take them for granted. In the United States, national, state, and
local territorial borders have taken on an increasingly illiberal character.
Polities, communities, and persons are being defined and regulated with
regard to various zones of legal, social, and political exclusion.
Territoriality is being used by governments to punish, control, restrict,
segregate, brand, demonize, and de-legalize certain persons and groups.
The territorial and resulting constitutional displacements raise fundamental
questions regarding the rule of law, membership in social and political
communities, the limits of punishment, and concepts like constitutional

549. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 31-63 (1983).
550. !d. at 45.
551. See generally DAVID M. SMITH, GEOGRAPHY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (1994) (examining
intersection between place and social justice concerns).

608

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

86:515

personhood and dignity. There are historical, social, political, and
constitutional explanations for the increasing resort to territorial
displacement. With regard to the last, this Article demonstrates that the
Constitution's own spatial framework contains troubling extra-territorial
and intra-territorial gaps in protection for basic liberties. It highlights the
critical intersection between territory and liberty, and urges more careful
attention to the manner in which laws create and alter territorial borders.
Respect for the rule of law, commitment to principles of liberal
democracy, and concern for social justice all require that we work toward
narrowing these spatial gaps.

